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CHAPTER ONE
TRIBAL CLASHES IN THE
RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE
Tribal clashes in the Rift Valley Province started on 29th October, 1991, at a farm known
as Miteitei, situated in the heart of Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, pitting the Nandi,
a Kalenjin tribe, against the Kikuyu, the Kamba, the Luhya, the Kisii, and the Luo.
The clashes quickly spread to other farms in the area, among them, Owiro, farm which
was wholly occupied by the Luo; and into Kipkelion Division of Kericho District, which
had a multi-ethnic composition of people, among them the Kalenjin, the Kisii and the
Kikuyu.
Later in early 1992, the clashes spread to Molo, Olenguruone, Londiani, and other
parts of Kericho, Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and many other parts of the Rift Valley
Province. In 1993, the clashes spread to Enoosupukia, Naivasha and parts of Narok, and
the Trans Mara Districts which together then formed the greater Narok before the Trans
Mara District was hived out of it, and to Gucha District in Nyanza Province.
In these areas, the Kipsigis and the Maasai, were pitted against the Kikuyu, the Kisii,
the Kamba and the Luhya, among other tribes. The clashes revived in Laikipia and Njoro
in 1998, pitting the Samburu and the Pokot against the Kikuyu in Laikipia, and the
Kalenjin mainly against the Kikuyu in Njoro.
In each clash area, non-Kalenjin or non-Maasai, as the case may be, were suddenly
attacked, their houses set on fire, their properties looted and in certain instances, some of
them were either killed or severely injured with traditional weapons like bows and
arrows, spears, pangas, swords and clubs.
The raiders were well organized and coordinated. Their attacks were generally under
the cover of darkness, and where the attacks were in broad daylight, the raiders would
smear their faces with clay to conceal their identities. The attackers targeted mainly the
Kikuyu, but also the Kisii, the Luhya and the Luo; other non-Kalenjin and non-Masaai
communities were not spared.
The attacks were barbaric, callous and calculated to drive out the targeted groups from
their farms, to cripple them economically and to psychologically traumatise them. Many
of the victims were forced to camp in schools, church compounds and shopping centres.
There they lived in makeshift structures of polythene sheets, cardboard and similar
materials.
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They had little food and belongings with them and lived in poor sanitary conditions
with their children who could no longer go to school. There was also a general lack of
concern by the Provincial Administration and the Police Force for their security and
general welfare.
In general, the clashes started and ended suddenly, and left a trail of destruction,
suffering and disruption of life hitherto unknown in this country. The causes of the
clashes have been given as conflict over land, cattle rustling, political differences and
ecological reasons among others. As stated elsewhere in this Report, these reasons were
proffered to conceal the real motive or reason for the clashes.
The issue of border conflicts between the communities has been discussed over and
over again, in various fora; various approaches have been tried but to no significant avail.
In 1964, a joint border meeting between the local dstrict leaders from both Narok and
Kisii led by the Regional Presidents of Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces, Johnson
Keragori and Daniel Arap Moi, was held to promote peace after the two communities had
clashed, inter alia, because of the unwise utterances by politicians.
At this meeting, the making of inciting speeches was not condemned. The leaders
preached only peace. Subsequently, on 5th April, 1967, the question of unsavoury and
inciting utterances was raised in Parliament and in the course of the debate, the Assistant
Minister, Vice President's Office and Minister of Home Affairs, Mr Matano, remarked,
inter alia, as follows:
"Mr Speaker, on this question of the clashes between the Maasai and the Kipsigis,
there have been some incidents, and we do not want to deny it. There have been a few
incidents here and there and, I regret to say that with regard to a lot of those instigations
and some of the things that have been happening on the boundaries, the blame really lies
on some leaders of this country. I would not like to say which leaders because I feel it is
irrelevant, but I feel that if we restrain ourselves and try to help our own people to try to
understand one another more and more, I am sure, Mr. Speaker, we shall have less of
these incidents."
The importance of the foregoing excerpt is the fact that whilst efforts were made to
deal with issues like stock theft and border conflict at local and national levels, we
received no evidence of efforts made to deal with unsavoury and inflammatory
statements by politicians, who according to the evidence that we received, tend to side
with their ethnic communities whenever they face a conflicts situation involving them.
The re-introduction of multi-partyism, tended to magnify and fuel tribal loyalties and
to complicate the resolution of inter-tribal border conflicts not only, along the Trans Mara
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South Kisii border but also, along the cutline between the Samburu-Pokot and the Kikuyu
in Laikipia among other areas.
People in the Rift Valley Province generally tended to follow what their tribal leaders
and more particularly, elected leaders, tell them and would not normally follow any
counsel, however wise, it may be, from any other quarter if it conflicted with what their
leaders had propounded. This was really the crux of the matter regarding the clashes in
the Rift Valley Province.
Although we have talked generally in the INTRODUCTION of this Report about the
Provincial Administration, we consider it necessary, because of their seemingly partisan
role in the clashes in the Rift Valley Province, to say a little bit more about them here.
As we have stated elsewhere, in this Report, the Provincial Administration had over
the years, increasingly been politicised to the extent that in the advent of multi-partyism
in 1991, they were averse to any remarks made against Kanu the party in power, and
whatever action they took had to show their loyalty and support for it. Consequently,
when the tribal clashes broke out in the Rift Valley Province, for example, they were not
sympathetic to those perceived to be opposition supporters and sympathisers.
For instance, in the Kericho District, two successive District Commissioners, Timothy
Sirma and Nicholas Mberia did not care a whit when Luo residents on the Kericho side of
the border between it and Kisumu, were evicted. When Nicholas Mberia was asked
where he expected the squatters he caused to be evicted from Thessalia livestock holding
ground to go to, his response was that they were expected to return to where they
originally came from.
He did not at all, endeavour to find out whether they had anywhere to go to before
ordering their unlawful eviction. Even when they sought and obtained refuge at a nearby
mission and a primary school, he later followed them there and had then forcibly ejected.
The only reason which we could discern for his uncaring attitude towards them, was that
it was because they were perceived to be Ford Kenya supporters, and also, because they
were Luo who were occupying land the Kipsigis who like him, were Kalenjin, considered
to be theirs.
We also have the case of Christopher Mwashi, the District Officer 1 of Nandi District,
who in October, 1991, was shouted down by a Kanu Location Chairman at a meeting in
Miteitei farm, because of his apparent sympathy with the non-Nandi who were
considered to be supporters of multi-party politics.
The District Commissioners and the Provincial Commissioners on the other hand,
have over the years since 1964, increasingly taken over the role which we think wholly
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lies with the police, of directing security operations, arguing that they are directly in
charge of the security situations in their areas.
This did in a way, hamper the police operations in quelling the clashes as of ten times,
the police had to look up to them for directions as to what action should be taken in that
regard. In the process, there was delay in dealing with the raiders who in the meantime,
inflicted extensive destruction before police action was taken against them. Moreover, as
happened in Thessalia, some District Commissioners, under the guise that they were
dealing with threat to security in their areas, engaged in illegal. activities which were
contrary to law, to achieve purposes which, to say the least, were not within their docket.
In Thessalia, which we will discuss in detail later, Nicholas Mberia, using armed
police officers unlawfully and forcibly evicted without the requisite court order, Luo
squatters from a piece of land which to his knowledge was not government land but
which he argued and asserted was government land, on the pretext that their continued
presence there posed a security problem. As we shall also see later, no such problem
existed. No evidence was adduced nor was any available to support his assertions. The
reason for evicting the squatters which eventually emerged, was a political one namely,
to remove the Luo who were perceived to be opposition party supporters, from the area
which was regarded as a Kanu zone.
NANDI DISTRICT
Miteitei farm, as the farm came to be known, had a block title in the name of Miteitei
Farmers Co. Ltd. Prior to its purchase by the four hundred and fourteen shareholders,
Nyakinyua Women's group comprising Kikuyu women only, had wanted to buy it and
actually took possession of it. The Nandi, however, resisted the acquisition of the land by
the group, and through threats, blatantly, forced the group out of the farm
merely because they were non-Kalenjin.
The dispute among the shareholders of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd, arose when they
could not agree on the acreage of the farm which each of them would get. The Nandi
insisted that each of them had to get at least five acres per share, while the other
shareholders wanted the farm to be subdivided among all shareholders.
A committee was established by the then area District Officer, Cosmas Mutai,
comprising mainly of the Nandi, under the Chairmanship of the area Chief, Philip
Kipserein Karonei, to find a solution to the problem, The committee eventually drew up a
list of three hundred and nine names, all except nine who were Kalenjin, and presented
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them to the area District Commissioner, Mr Paul Yatich, also a Kalenjin, as the genuine
shareholders.
That fact, and the fact that the Nandi wanted to be given not less than five acres per
share, engendered a dispute between the three hundred and nine who were all Nandi, and
those whose names were left out, who all happened to be non-Kalenjin and who
numbered two hundred and eighty six. The dispute, despite several attempts, remained
unsolved.
The tension between the rival tribal groups increased with each passing day until
October, 1991, when tribal clashes broke out, and which was really an excuse to drive the
non-Nandi out of Tinderet Division. Ibrahim Injaga Livanze as the Secretary of the
Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd which owned the farm, described the problem in the farm as
shown in the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 25th
February, 1999, thus:
"The problem was tribal land. That the Kalenjin did not want other people to live on
their land while they were landless."
Prior to clashes, Security Intelligence reports and other reports on the dispute and the
growing tension between the rival tribal groups, had reached the District Commissioner
of the area, David Kiilu Mativo, the Chairman of the District Security Committee, who
decided to meet the two groups with a view to resolving their dispute.
However, on 28th October, 1991, he instead, sent his then District Officer I,
Christopher Mwashi to the farm to meet the opposing groups with instructions, for the
second time, to identify who were the genuine shareholders and who were not. He was
also to check on the financial management of the company. But we must emphasise that
neither the District Commissioner nor the District Officer I had any right in law to
interfere with the affairs of the Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd, a limited liability company, in
which they were not shareholders.
When Christopher Mwashi arrived at Miteitei Trading Centre, where he found the
rival shareholders separately seated his attempts to get them seated together failed. There
was open mutual dislike for each other and at some stage the rival shareholders traded
abuses. Because an explosive situation was anticipated several armed policemen under
the command of the then Chief Inspector of Police in Charge of Songhor Police Station,
Julius Ndegwa, were also present at the meeting to contain any incidents of violence.
Although the meeting was one of shareholders of a limited liability company it appeared
to have generated a lot of interest among other people who were not shareholders.
Three paramount chiefs had been invited to attend the meeting so also was the Kanu
sub-location chairman who though not a shareholder, rudely presented to Christopher
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Mwashi in the course of the meeting a list of three hundred and fourteen mainly Kalenjin
whom he claimed were the only genuine shareholders of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd.
The involvement and presence of the Kanu sub-location chairman in the meeting of
the shareholders showed that there was a political dimension to the dispute. The attempt
by Christopher Mwashi to ignore the intervention of the Kanu sub-location chairman,
caused those in the list he presented to become rowdy and abusive. They disrupted the
meeting as made it impossible for Mr Christopher to continue. He hurriedly closed the
meeting and left with his entourage. The rival group of non-Kalenjin shareholders also
dispersed, but the group of mainly Kalenjin shareholders remained behind and held a
meeting from about 4 pm. until after 7 pm.
Ibrahim Livanze in his evidence before us, had told us that he had talked to the Nandi,
presumably before the meeting was held, and they had told him that they did not want
non-Kalenjin in their midst, and that they would drive them out. Special branch Officer
Potash Anudo Owuo also testified that the Nandi had said they would solve the land
dispute "Kipgaa," meaning that they would find a home made solution to the conflict,
which was quite consistent with what the Majimbo crusaders were then preaching.
It should be recalled that a month or so before the meeting of the shareholders, Kanu
political rallies were held at Kapsabet in Nandi District, Kapkatet in Kericho District, and
Narok town in Narok District, during which as we earlier stated,
several prominent Kalenjin politicians drummed up the idea of driving out non-Kalenjin
from the Rift Valley Province if they did not support Kanu.
As things turned out, about a month after the last one of those Kanu political rallies
and two days after the Miteitei meeting houses of all the non-Kalenjin, except about nine,
and including grain stores on Miteitei farm, were set ablaze and burnt down, an act which
in effect forced the affected people to flee Miteitei farm.
To this day they had not been allowed back. The only shop premises on the farm
which belonged to a Kisii was also burnt down implying that the matter was more than a
dispute over shares in a land owning company. We were told that soon thereafter, in or
about June, 1992, the farm was surveyed and shared among the so called genuine
members and titles were issued to them to the exclusion of those who had been driven
away. Those ejected, lost not only, the land but also, the money they had paid to buy
shares in the farm.
We were told that the Nandi were unwilling to refund any money to those they
evicted, arguing that whatever money they had paid for their shares in Miteitei Farmers
Co. Ltd. was rent for the farms they had occupied. Ibrahim Livanze stated as follows in
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as shown in the the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of
25th February, 1999, that:
"Mr. Livanze: The problem now was that they had divided themselves. The 3 14 and
279 had divided themselves. The 279 were non-Kalenjin and 314 were Kalenjin. Now,
the 314 wanted to chase the 279; that: 'You will not get land. What you have paid here,
you have earned. You have milked this land for enough time. Now, you must go.'
Justice Bosire: So, the argument was that the money which they had paid was treated
as rent for the use of the land?
Livanze: It was taken that way, My Lords. That the money which the 279 had paid
was rent for that period and now the rented time was up and they should have gone.".
The above statement is almost in all fours with the following one which was made by
a Provincial Administration Officer, P. H. Brown in his handing over notes to his
colleague, R. Symes-Thompson:
"Recently a European farm at Kaimosi came up for sale and its disposal is still being
argued at the time of writing. The Nandi I think would be happy to pay, if necessary by a
special rate, for any land but in respect of these two areas i.e. Sarora and Kaimosi they
could claim that it is their land, leased to the Europeans, and that therefore there should
not be any necessity for them to purchase it.".
Owiro farm in Songhor location, Tinderet Division, was bought from one European
called Evanson, by a group of Luo, with money contributed by them and bridging finance
from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. Clashes on this and several nearby farms in
Songhor Location, in which the occupants were predominantly Luo, started on 1st
November, 1991, and were allegedly due to the reaction by the Nandi to the rumour that a
Kalenjin, Julius Kipsang, had been killed by a Luo policeman.
Julius Kipsang was indeed shot and killed but not by a Luo, but by a Kalenjin police
constable Julius Langat. The Nandis attacked and either killed any Luo they came across
or looted and burnt their houses. Surprisingly, the looting and arson extended to all the
non-Kalenjin implying that the reason for doing so, was not merely the killing of Julius
Kipsang.
The attacks were vicious, barbaric and traumatising and that forced the non-Kalenjin
out of their farms; they camped at Songhor Police Station, Kopere Trading Centre and
Chemelil in Nyanza, among other places. Many have not returned to date to their farms.
One Angira, who tried to return to Owiro farm to harvest some farm produce was
attacked and killed by people suspected to be the Nandi. Such attacks brought fear to the
refugees and made many to sell their shares in the farm to the Kalenjin. Some simply
abandoned their farms and settled elsewhere.
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In those farms, unlike Miteitei farm, some of the people whose houses were burnt
have settled back on their land.
Those who raided and burnt houses in, Owiro farm were, in general said to have worn
white shorts and green T-shirts implying that the attacks were carefully planned and
executed. That and the other reasons given elsewhere in this report exclude the possibility
that the attacks were provoked by the killing of Julius Kipsang. Kipsang's death was
clearly an excuse given to disguise the real reason for the attacks.
Besides, Henry Tuwei, a Kalenjin, and the Chief of Songhor Location, testified that he
had prior knowledge of impending attacks on Owiro farm, and instead of informing the
Officer Commanding Songhor Police Station, who was only a few kilometres from his
office, of this, he chose to travel over 50 km to Kapsabet town to inform the District
Commissioner of the impending attack.
The Chief's conduct was clearly suspect and smacks of a person who knew and
approved of the acts of murder, arson and looting of the non-Kalenjin houses in Owiro.
We recommend that he be further investigated with a view to being prosecuted as we
think he was an accessory to the clashes.
Two reasons were given for the inter-ethnic clashes in Tinderet Division. However, as
we have tried to demonstrate the reasons were merely excuses for the violence in the
various farms. Tinderet falls within the narrow belt on which European settlements lay
and as earlier on stated, it is an area that the Nandi have over the years, nursed an
ambition to recover.
After hearing various witnesses on the matter and after some research, we have conic
to the conclusion that the clashes in Tinderet had three basic underlying causes: Firstly,
the Nandi have over the years nursed the ambition of recovering what they think they lost
when the Europeans forcibly acquired their land in Tenderet among other areas.
The Nandi have all along, contended that Kipkelion, Londiani, Fort Tenan, are other
areas, are part of Tinderet and therefore part of Nandi District. Matters were made worse
when after independence, people whom the Nandi consider as foreigners, though African
Kenyans, acquired part of the land. The case of Miteitei farm was a case in point.
Genuine shareholders verge driven out of what in law was their land which was then
subsequently shared are the Nandis on the alleged reason that those driven out were
squatting on other people's land. Secondly, the Nandi like all other Kalenjin detest
foreigners living in their midst, and worse still, owning land among them. The clashes
seem to us to have been aimed at removing the foreigners who as stated elsewhere, were
derogatorily referred to as "madoadoa".
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The third reason for the clashes is politics and ethnic loyalty. In the period
immediately before and after political independence in Kenya, the Kalenjin were largely
in Kadu. When their political leaders decided to dissolve that party to join Kanu the
Kalenjin almost to a man followed their leaders and joined Kanu. They, similarly
remained in Kanu en bloc when in 1966, some politicians crossed the floor in Parliament
from Kanu to join the newly formed KPU of Oginga Odinga. The crusade for multipartyism was viewed by the Kalenjin as a disguised attempt to remove their own as
President of Kenya in favour of a non-Kalenjin.
The political rallies of September, 1991, which were held at Kapsabet, in Nandi
District, Kapkatet in Kericho District and Narok in Narok District, and addressed by
largely Kaleqjin political leaders must be looked at against that background. The Kalenjin
political leaders who included Henry Kosgey, tile then and current Kanu Chairman in
Nandi, Ezekiel Barngetuny, and John Cheruiyot, all from Nandi and who were and still
are Kanu stalwarts, advocated and preached "Majimbo" during those rallies.
"Majimbo" according to the evidence presented to us was not federalism in the real
sense of the word, but an arrangement in which each community would be required to
return to its ancestral district or province and if for any reason they would be reluctant or
unwilling to do so, they would by all means be forced so to do.
The majimbo rallies, which were widely publicised in the print media, and whose
proceedings were confirmed by witnesses who were present among them, John Keen and
Willy Kamuren, were intended to counter the then on going campaign for the reintroduction of plural politics in Kenya.
As we stated earlier, the Kalenjin viewed multipartyism. as a veiled attempt to
dislodge from office their own as President of Kenya. The predominance of prominent
Kalenjin politicians in those rallies is clear testimony that they felt the.-by would lose a
great deal if multi-partyism was re-introduced in Kenya, and hence their unequivocal
remarks at those rallies that they would forcibly evict those who supported multipartyism.
It is noteworthy that the Kalenjin tend generally to accept and to follow their leaders
in political Issues. In his evidence Chief Jonathan Kibaibaii Rogony of Kamasian
Location, in Kipkelion Division, of Kericho District, stated that he believed that because
H.E. the President had crossed from Kadu to Kanu with all his followers and since then
remained in Kanu, the Kalenjin leaders assumed that only Kanu would be supported in
their areas, and other political parties were unwelcome.
The majimbo rallies appeared to be intended to pass a message to the Kalenjin
community that the path their leaders had chosen was to stick in Kanu and any other

10

political thinking had to be resisted even by use of arms. We do not think that clashes
started at Miteitei, in Nandi, by coincidence.
We think that like in other parts of the country, they were carefully planned to exploit
the existing Nandi ambition to recover
ancestral land and to drive away the "madoadoa" in order to achieve the main political
purpose of making Nandi a Kanu zone. The attacks were also carefully executed and
followed a common pattern.
Kamasai is a village in Soymining sub-location in Chepterwai Location in Kipkaren
Division of Nandi District. This area, unlike Miteitei which was a settlement area, was
part of the former Nandi native reserve. Its residents were mainly the Nandi, the Luhya,
the Masaai and the Teso. The Nandi were the indigenous community in the area while the
other communities settled in the area after purchasing land from the Nandi. We were told
that many of those who had bought land there did not have title deeds to their respective
farms mainly because the Nandi were reluctant to effect the transfer of title to them.
In some few cases, the vendors had migrated to Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Districts
and their specific areas of residence there were unknown. They would not therefore be
traced to take the necessary steps to effect the transfers.
The clashes in the area like many other areas started and ended suddenly, and pitted
the Nandi against the Luhya the Teso and the Maasai. The Nandi, in one night, burnt
more than twenty four houses belonging mainly to the Luhya but also a few belonging to
the other non-Nandi tribes.
A warning scream in Kinandi had been heard and which was followed by the
widespread burning of those houses. The few non-Nandi houses which were left, were
later, in January 1992, burnt by the Nandi.
Regarding the causes of the clashes in Kamasai, the Chief of Chepterwai Location,
Julius Pekyibei arap Bett, gave what we considered to be a ridiculous reason for the
clashes, and which in any event, was unsupported by a witness Samuel Kipkoske Kitur,
who was present when the alleged incident took place and who would have been, but was
not, aware of that fact.
The Chiefs account was that one Agola Akumu, a Luhya, along with some Nandi and
Luhya, were drinking busaa, a local brew, in the home of one Rosyline Cheptoo, a Nandi.
Also there with them, was Samuel Kipkoskei, Kitur, a nephew of Rosyline Cheptoo. As
they were drinking, a disagreement arose between Agola Akumu and Samuel Kitur
which, according to the Chief, was because Agola Akumu wanted to sleep with Rosyline
but which he could not do as Samuel Kitur refused to go away. Agola Akumu got
annoyed and hit Samuel Kitur with a walking stick injuring him badly. Fearing reprisals,
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Agola Akumu ran to his house which he set on fire and to divert attention from his action,
shouted out that Samuel Kitur was the arsonist.
The Luhya responding to his calls then set on fire several Nandi houses in retaliation.
This in turn, provoked the Nandi to also burn Luhya houses. The Chief, continuing his
ridiculous story, further stated that prior to all this, the Luhya had been in the habit of
calling the Nandi stupid people, which upset the Nandi who, when the opportunity
presented itself, in late November, 1991, decided to drive out all the Luhyas from the
sub-location.
These were merely excuses for the clashes as the real reason for the clashes was
political and which was at the same time, a form of ethnic cleansing. We have explained
these in detail in our discussion of the Miteitei clashes and only, wish to add that the
timing of the clashes at Kamasai and elsewhere, lend support to the view that they were
planned and executed to achieve political ends.
With regard to the role of, and action by, the Provincial Administration and the Police
Force we were told that both the Provincial Administration Officers and the Police Force
were warned of impending trouble at Miteitei farm. The Special Branch Officer, Potash
Anudo Owuo, told us that he was aware of rising tension between two rivals groups of
shareholders of the Miteitei Farmers Company Ltd, a fact which l immediately passed on
to both David Mativo the District Commissioner and Chief Inspector Julius Ndegwa.
Yet neither took steps to pre-empt any violence that was clearly evident. Julius
Ndegwa did, however, leave some few policemen behind to deal with any possible
violence. The policemen remained at the farm overnight, and were relieved by others the
next day. Yet when houses started burning they were unavailable either to avert or to stop
the burning; nor was the said Julius Ndegwa able to explain where they were and why
they were unable to prevent the burning of the houses.
The evidence we received was to the effect that their presence got known when
gunfire was heard from one part of the farm but only after several houses had been burnt
down. Among the buildings that were burnt down was the only shop at Miteitei Trading
Centre, which was owned and run by Wilfred Basweti, a Kisii, who was also a
shareholder in Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd.
It was near that shop that the meeting which aborted was held; and it was there too,
that the policemen who were detailed to patrol the area were based.
The behaviour of the police in Owiro farm, was not any better. We were told that in
each case, they arrived after houses had burnt down, and whenever they saw houses being
torched, they did not at all attempt to arrest the arsonists. We were also told that
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whenever they used their guns they merely fired into the air, a fact which neither stopped
nor deterred the burnings.
It is our view that the conduct of the police smacked of negligence, cowardice, and
callousness. Indeed, whatever they did, was clearly inadequate and bordered on
condoning the clashes. It is unthinkable that all non Nandi houses except the negligible
few, could be torched and razed down, in more than three locations without any single
person being positively identified, arrested and successfully prosecuted for it.
A few people who were arrested were merely scape goats, and in any case, many of
them were released without charges being preferred against them; and where any charges
were preferred the investigation of the cases was conducted in a half hearted manner.
For instance, Julius Ndegwa told us that many of the suspects who were arrested for
arson were released because the complainants could not be traced. That was a ridiculous
statement to make. Those displaced came from somewhere. No effort was made to look
for them.
This clearly showed that the police were unwilling for whatever reason, to arrest and
to charge the arsonists. We were told for instance that a number of people were arrested
for various offences but were released on the instructions of the Officer Commanding
Police Division Nandi, Mr. Otieno, since deceased.
Moreover, those who were arrested were on charges mainly of being in possession of
dangerous weapons, to wit bows and arrows which ordinarily are traditionally possessed
by the Nandi.
The manner in which the police went about their work suggests that they had prior
warning of impending clashes but did not want to do anything positive to avert or quell
them. The Provincial Administration, like the Police Force were quite insensitive to the
security situation, and in most cases they did not care a whit.
Even though the area District Commissioner, David Mativo who was also the
Chairman of the District Security Committee had been told that the security situation in
Miteitei was volatile, he suspiciously, did not consider it important enough to suspend
other business so as to deal with the matter himself. He sent his deputy who, to say the
least, fuelled an already bad situation and then ran away.
By his action in trying to ascertain who were and who were not shareholders, of
Miteitei farmers Co. Ltd., something which had earlier been done by his predecessors, he
made the shareholders believe we think, that no solution was in sight to their long
outstanding dispute. No wonder, the majority group said later that they would resolve the
dispute "Kipgaa", the home way.
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Apart from Christopher Mwashi, the other officers of the Provincial Administration
below the District Commissioner were all Kalenjin. The Judicial Commission was told
that the area Chief, Philip Karonei, was siding with the Nandi shareholders in the Miteitei
dispute. He chaired a committee which the previous area District Officer, Cosmas Mutai,
had appointed to determine the genuine shareholders of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd. and
which committee had eliminated the non Nandis from the list of shareholders. He was
clearly partisan and seemingly part of a scheme to evict non Nandi out of the District.
Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd. having been promoted by the non Nandi to the exclusion of
the Nandi it was illogical to say that even some of those who started the company did not
qualify as genuine shareholders. His role in the clashes should be further investigated
with a view to charges of being an accessory being preferred against him.
The Senior Chief of Songhor Location, Henry Cheruiyot Arap Tuwei likewise should
be further investigated. On the night clashes broke out at Owiro farm at about 11 pm on
1st November 1991, he had shortly prior thereto been at the scene where the burning of
Luo houses later started. He had been in the company of two policemen and they had met
Johnson Odero Omala, whom he told that they were there to provide security.
The burning of houses having started soon after he and the policemen had left clearly
suggests that his presence there was merely to hoodwink Johnson Omala and his
neighbours into believing that all was well. We believe he was one of those behind the
clashes in Songhor Location and should be investigated.
The Chief of Kimasai, Julius Pekyibei arap Bett, like his counterpart in Miteitei
Location, evidently condoned the burning of the non-Nandi houses in his Location,
because if that were not so, he would have, but he did not, taken steps to verify the
ridiculous story he presented to us on the cause of the clashes in his Location. Moreover,
he did little to either stop the clashes or to assist the victims thereof.
We also received evidence that the District Officer of Tinderet Division R. K. Kirui,
forcibly took away the shareholders register of Miteitei Farmers Co. Ltd. from the
Company Secretary, Ibrahim Livanze, a fact which was confirmed to be true. But what
right did the District Officer have to seize the register of the limited liability company?
This unlawful act points to the fact that both the District Officer, and the Chief of Miteitei
Location were partisan in their handling of the affairs of Miteitei farm, and tacitly
approved the burning of the houses belonging to the non Nandi.
It is no wonder, therefore, that as Ibrahim Livanze said, they, the leaders of the
company, could not complain to the Provincial Administration as the latter supported the
Nandi against them.
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KERICHO DISTRICT
Kericho, an agriculturally rich District with undulating highlands, generous rainfall, and
good soil was originally comprised of the present Kericho, Bomet and Buret Districts,
The latter two were carved out recently from the greater Kericho District. The
indigenous inhabitants of the greater Kericho District, the Kipsigis, one of the Kalenjin
tribes, had by 1991, as their neighbours, the Luo the Kisii, the Nandi and the Maasai.
The District, as it then was, like several other Districts in the Rift Valley Province,
was affected by European settlements which covered several areas including Kipkelion
and Londiani, Chirchila (Fort Tenan), Thessalia, Sondu and Sotik. For the purposes of
this Report we will confine ourselves to a few of those areas which were among those in
the country which were affected by the infamous ethnic clashes which rocked our country
in 1991 and thereafter, notably Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londian; Thessalia and Sondu.
Except Sondu, all the other areas border Tinderet Division of Nandi District, which we
discussed earlier.
We also have Burnt Forest in Uasin Gishu District and Molo in Nakuru District
bordering Londiani Division and both of which Districts formed part of the European
settlements which we will discuss later. We propose to deal now with the Chirchila,
Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions together and Thessalia and Sondu, separately because
of their divergent backgrounds.
Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions constitute an area wholly comprised of
settlement farms which, except for a few, were occupied by a mixture of ethnic
communities, notably, the Kalenjin, who were the majority, the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the
Luo, the Kamba and the Luhya.
The, Kikuyu moved to the area after 1952, to look for work in former European farms,
and by 1957, their numbers had grown so immensely that their presence was causing
concern to the colonial government with the result that regulations were promulgated to
regulate their entry into and stay in Kericho District. In his annual report for 1957, the
area District Commissioner remarked, in pertinent part, as follows:
"As has been stated elsewhere in this report the existing Kikuyu pilot schemes were
extended this year to the tune of 500 additional families. For security reasons it is not
proposed to allow further employment of members of this tribe, until experience of the
present scheme indicates that it is safe to do so."
We however, hasten to add that the European settlers regarded the Kikuyu as
providing better quality labour than the other tribes and consequently pressed for the
relaxation of entry regulations, which was done and two thousand and four hundred
Kikuyu men, women and children were, in 1957 and subsequent years, allowed entry into
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Nandi Hills Tinderet, and into Songhor, Chirchila and Lubwa in Kericho District. Of
these, except for four hundred who went to Nandi Hills, the rest of the Kikuyu were
absorbed in the other areas. The geographical area of Lubwa comprised Kipkelion and
Londiani Divisions.
The Kikuyus who then settled in parts of Chirchila, Londiani and Kipkelion were,
after independence, among the squatters and former European workers who were settled
on Mutaragon farm in Kipkelion, under the aegis of the Commissioner For Squatters.
Mutaragon farm is one of several farms which comprise Kipkelion and Londiani
Divisions.
Chirchila formerly Fort Tenam is now a Division on its own. Although the Kipsigis
claim the three divisions were part of their ancestral land which was taken over for
European settlement, the Nandi too, claim that the two among other Divisions were part
of Tinderet, which as stated earlier, the Nandi have over the years sought to reclaim.
Be that as it may, whether the areas originally belonged to the Kipsigis or the Nandi is
not for consideration here. What is significant, however, is that the two Divisions are now
cosmopolitan; the majority of the people resident there have been living there since
colonial times; they did not have any overt conflicts among them, and presently own the
land they occupy which is duly registered either in their names, or in the name of a
cooperative society or land buying company in which they own shares.
Unlike Miteitei farm land disputes among shareholders, where they existed were
merely confined to boundary disputes which were in any event, quite isolated.
Chirchila and Kipkelion Divisions but not Londiani Division, border the former
Kipsigis native reserve, and like all other administrative divisions elsewhere In the
country the two Divisions were dividend into Locations. Those which concern us Include
Kunyak (Kapkoros), Koguta, Kiptenam, Minihaha in Chirchila; Kamasian and Kipsige in
Kipkelion; and Sorget in Londiani.
Each of those Locations had several farms most of which were occupied by mixed
ethnic communities notably the Kalenjin, the Kikuyu and the Kisii, in varying numbers.
But in Chirchila most of the residents are the Kalenjin, the Luo, the Kikuyu and the Kisii.
Until 1991, when clashes broke out, the mixed settlements did not pose any noticeable
problems, as the residents had after acquiring their farms, quickly settle down
got
their land registered in their names, built schools and churches for their common use,
soon elected their parliamentary and civic, representatives, and got administrative
Locations and Sub-Locations with Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs to handle their day to day
problems.

16

Most, if not all the farms, had been acquired by 1971, when the country was a de facto
one party state with KANU as the only political party. By 1991, the member of
parliament for the area, was William Kikwaii, a Kipsigis, and the local councillors who
were at least four, were largely Kipsigiis.
All the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs were also Kipsigis, a fact which we were told did
not auger well with the other ethnic communities who felt that at least, appointments to
administrative posts should be evenly shared amongst the ethnic communities. We were
told that among the matters which angered the Kipsigis was the fact that some of the
Kisii showed a keen interest in elective as well as administrat positions. This issue did
not, however, visibly strain the inter-ethnic relationship which according to the evidence
we heard, was good.
Witnesses told us that there were cases of inter-tribal marriages, free social interaction
and that generally the different communities tolerated each other. Tolerant co-existence
prevailed until 1991, when there began in the country, the clamour for multi-p arty
democracy.
The campaigns for multi-partyism and majimboism did not actually take place 'in
Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londian but they nevertheless affected the areas before the
onset of the tribal clashes.
Majimboism was intended to counter the fight for multipartyism. In Chirchila,
Kipkelion and Londiani the people there, particularly the Kipsigis, were aware of the
both campaigns and the inciting utterances made at the KANU political rallies at
Kapsabet and Kapkatet, and as we were told, the Kipsigis warned the other communities
to stick to KANU or else they would face dire consequences.
The Kipsigis, who like all the Kalenjin communities, supported KANU, would
sometimes when drunk openly say that they wanted "majimbo" so that they can evict the
non-Kalenjin from the Rift Valley Province and send them back to their ancestral homes.
For example one witness testified that the Assistant Chiefs used to threaten the nonKalenjin with dire consequences if they supported or talked about multi-partyism.
Paul Kipkemei Murei, a Kalenjin himself told us that, in or about November, 1991, he
heard that the Luo, the Kisii, and the Kikuyu who were the "madoadoa" because they
were perceived to be supporters of multi-partyism or its sympathizers, would be driven
away.
The tribal clashes in Kipkelion broke out on the night of 5th November, 1991, pitting
the Kipsigis against the Kikuyu, the Kisii the Luo, the Kamba and the Luhya, and were
confined mainly to Kamasian and Kipsige Locations. Kamasian Location borders
Tinderet Division, in Nandi District, where Miteitei farm is situated and the non-Nandi
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who were victims of the clashes which began in Miteitei farm on the night of 29th
October, 1991 fled and sought refuge in neighbouring areas more particularly, Tinderet
Tea Estates, Kamasian Location, Chirchila and Londiani Divisions.
The majority of the refugees who were the Kisii, crossed mainly into Mutaragon farm
in Kamasian Location where there were many Kisii residents. The Chief of Kamasian
Location, Jonathan Kibaibai Arap Rogony, told us that as soon as the Kisii from Miteitei
settled at Mutaragon farm there was general talk that the Nandi had vowed to pursue
them there and drive them away.
The refugees from Miteitei farm arrived in Kipkelion and parts of Chirchila Divisions
on 3rd and 4th November, 1991, and a day later the houses of the non kipsigis there,
began to be burnt.
We were told that about two or three weeks before this, a group of Kipsigis
councillors toured Kamasian Location. No evidence was given to connect the visit to the
clashes but the implication is obvious because it was almost soon after their tour that nonKipsigis houses began to be burnt there. Though the individual arsonists could lot be
identified it was stated that they were Kalenjin youths.
About two hundred of them were seen on 6th November, 1991, in broad daylight,
while armed with bows and arrows and other crude weapons, crossing from Leldet farm
into Kashin Trading Centre where they looted and burnt all shops belonging to the nonKalenjin.
There was a similar attack at Nyairobi Shopping Centre. They had smeared their faces
with ash, were swift and appeared to have well organized co-ordinated movements; they
were ruthless and barbaric and senselessly burnt even grain stores no doubt with a view
to traumatising and rendering their victims destitute and thus cause them to move out of
the area. One victim Naftali Nyaoma testified, in pertinent part, as contained In the
verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 6th April, 1999, as
follows:
"Mr. Chairman: The burning was meant to evict you, Why? So, that ......
Mr. Nyaoma: So that they may occupy the farms we had, my Lords.
Justice Bosire: Why do you say that?
Mr Nyaoma: Because, when I met some of these people who had taken beer, they used to
tell me that some houses which were not burnt, such as mine, were meant to be used by
some of them after we had gone.
Mr. Nyaoma: They used to complain: "Some of our youths had burnt the houses of Kisiis
and Kikuyus, because they were promised to get pieces of land; some were promised
jobs, and they never got them", my Lords.
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Mrs. Oduor: Did they say who had promised them jobs and land?
Mr. Nyaoma: They did not, my Lords.".
The burning of shops at Kashin and Nyairobi Trading Centres took place in broad
daylight which clearly shows that the arsonist who acted with impunity and blatantly had
some backing from high authority, but how high, we cannot possibly say as no evidence
was given in that regard.
There were incidents of retaliatory attacks in which the non-Kalenjin burnt several
Kalenjin houses. In isolated cases, they attacked and killed some of the Kalenjin had been
for instance, Lord Koech of Londiani. It was suspected that Kalenjin warriors training on
his farm to cause the clashes. He was attacked in his motor vehicle, a pick up, as he drove
from one of his farms to another.
His widow testified regarding his behaviour before he met his fate and in our view it
was rather strange. Despite the fact that a Kikuyu neighbour and friend had warned him
not to go to Londiani town on the fateful day, he nonetheless did. At the time of his
death, a jerrican with some petrol in it was found in his pick up which was suspected was
to be for use in burning non-Kalenjin houses.
The clashes in Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions started almost without
notice and ended abruptly. We were told that the causes were basically the reintroduction
of multiparty politics in the country and demonic influences. However a careful
examination of the evidence that we received, revealed that the well known Kalenjin
aversion to strangers living in their midst particularly on their ancestral land which had in
colonial times, been set aside for European settlement, was exploited for political
objectives.
This took the form of the attacks on, and the destruction of the property and the
senseless killing of innocent non-Kalenjin who were perceived as non supporters of
KANU so as to drive them away and make the Rift Valley Province overwhelmingly a
KANU zone and to make it possible come the December, 1992 general and presidential
elections, for the Kalenj in to vote as a bloc for KANU.
The Chief of Kamasian Location, Jonathan Kibaibai Rogony unequivocally stated that
political leaders in the area declared Kipkelion a KANU zone, because they feared that
non Kipsigis would join the opposition political parties. The local leaders' view appear to
have been the same. What Jonathan Rogony said on this issue as contained in the
verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 8th April, 1999, is as
follows:
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"Mr Rogony: My Lords, I think they were saying that, that was a Kanu zone because
since time immemorial KANU had gained support in the area because no other political
party had gone to campaign there.
Justice Bosire: There used to be KADU in 1962/1963, is that
not so?
Mr Rogony: Yes, my Lords.
Justice Bosire: And by that time KANU was there, as it not?
Mr Rogony: My Lords, at that time I was hearing about KADU not KANU.
Justice Bosire: When did KANU come to the area?
Mr Rogony: My Lords, I think it came to the area when H. E. the President and his
followers joined it.
Mr. Mureithi: And H. E. has not left KANU since that time, has he?
Mr Rogony: He has not, my Lords.
Mr Mureithi: Was that the reason why Kalenjin leaders assumed that, that area would
remain a KANU zone?
Mr Rogony: It might be so, My Lords.
Mr Mureithi: But that was a time when opposition political parties were being formed. Is
that true?
Mr Rogony: Yes, my Lords.
Mr Mureithi: Was the 'zoning' of the area meant to keep away opposition
Mr Rogony: My Lords, I think that was the way the leaders were talking."
Another witness, Silvanas Ngidi Akelo from Kunyak farm in Chirchila Division, and
who was a member of the peace and reconciliation committee in his Location, also stated
as follows as appears in the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial
Commission of 12th April 1999:
"Mr. Akello: My Lords, our neighbours said that the causes were because of political
language.
Mrs. Oduor: By saying your neighbours whom are you referring to?
Mr. Akello: My Lords, I am referring to the Kalenjin.
Mrs. Oduor: So, can you tell the Commission what you discussed about politics and how
it started that disturbance?
Mr. Akello: My Lords, they said that there was a political party which was formed by the
name of FORD and they said that FORD had come to interfere with peace in Kenya and
they did not want other parties to be registered which were being registered at that time."
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Joshua Kamau Macharia, a Kikuyu councillor from the Chepkongoni Ward,
Londiani, testified on the same issue as shown in the verbatim report of the proceedings
of the Judicial Commission of 16th April 1999, as follows:
"Mr. Chairman: How did multi-partyism bring about the
clashes?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, I would not say that multi-partyism brought about the clashes. I
think that people did not understand multi-partyism. When multi-partyism came, people
thought that these were parties on community basis and they did not understand and that
is why there were some differences because when we had a single party system, we did
not experience such a thing.
Mr. Chairman: What was the misunderstanding about multipartyism?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, there was an argument because most of the supporters of the
Opposition parties were Kikuyus and the supporters of KANU were Kipsigis.
Mr. Chairman: And so?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, people did not understand political parties and they took them
to be parties on tribal basis. They took DP and FORD (A) to be parties for Kikuyus and
KANU for the Kipsigis. Mr. Chairman: So,---?
Mr. Chairman: So, the Kikuyus were to leave?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, the Kikuyus were supposed to leave because they had shown
openly that they were not supporting KANU. And they were the ones who came with the
Opposition.
Mr. Chairman: They were supposed to leave, is that what you
are saying?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, they were being told that they were going to leave.
Justice Bosire: If they did not support KANU, or they will leave no matter what?
Mr. Macharia: My Lords, they were supposed to leave if they were not going to support
KANU."
It should also be noted that according to the Constitution a successful Presidential
candidate was required to garner at least 25% of all the votes cast in at least five of the
eight provinces in the country, and at the same time have the highest number of votes cast
countrywide. The zoning of areas as KANU zones was clearly a move in that direction
although it was not so openly expressed.
Besides, the Kalenjin leaders made it abundantly clear, at Kapsabet, Kapkatet and
Narok KANU political rallies, that they would not tolerate support for political parties
other than KANU in the whole of the Rift Valley Province. In this respect it is more than
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a coincidence that the clashes in Tinderet, Chirchila and Kipkelion Divisions occurred
within a month and half after these three KANU political rallies, were held and which
means that the Kalenjin responded expeditiously to the calls which were made in these
rallies to the effect that those who did not support KANU, would be unwelcome in the
Rift Valley Province and would be driven away.
From the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that the Kalenjin who attacked,
killed or injured the non-Kalenjin and burnt their houses were recruited, and trained and
financed by some powerful people to violently evict the non-Kalenjin. The Kalenjin
raiders who attacked the non-Kalenjin and destroyed their properties in Chirchila,
Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions came in large numbers and in some cases, in broad
daylight. They mysteriously disappeared eluding the police, after completing their
mission. Only a well trained and organized militia could execute the forays the Kalenjin
raiders did.
It is also important to state here that the inciting utterances and tribal attitude made
and adopted by the Kalenjin politicians in the Kapsabet, Kapkatet and Narok KANU
political rallies was clearly an anti-thesis of the declared government policy that Kenya
should be a unified, peaceful and non-tribalistic society and one which respects the rule
of law.
The then member of parliament for Kipkelion, William Kikwai, a Majimbo proponent
and the area Councillors, Chumo and Benjamin Ruto, were among the local political
leaders, who were said to have intimidated the non-Kalenjiin with violence and eviction
if they did not support KANU. We think that their roles in the clashes should be further
investigated.
The clashes did to some decree achieve their intended purposes. Many of the nonKalenjin left Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londiani Divisions after the clashes and were not
there as at the time of the December, 1992, general elections to vote, and others either
sold to or exchanged their land with the Kalenjin who owned land in areas like
Nyahururu. We were told that over fifty Kikuyu in one farm and others in other farms,
had either sold their land to the, Kalenjin or exchanged them for land belonging to the
Kalenjin.
Unlike the clashes in Miteitei farm and those in Thessalia which we will next
consider, no reasons other than the political cause, were proferred as that which may have
immediately triggered the clashes in the Chirchila, Kipkelion and Londiani Division.
Thessalia, otherwise known as Buru Hill or the area with red soil, takes its name from
Thessalia Mission of the Free Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya Church which is situated
South-West of Muhoroni Town. The part which concerns us is the land designated L.R.
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No.3979 which, on or about May, 1924, was alienated to three European settlers by the
colonial government for a 99 years lease. In or about 4th January, 1951, the leasehold
interest was transferred to Margaritis Plantations Limited, which in turn,transferred one
hundred and eighteen acres of it to Arvid Gumerius Bustgaard, on 23rd September, 1959.
By special resolution Margaritis Plantations Ltd, went into self liquidation and
appointed two liquidators on 4th September 1967, who transferred to George Evangelos
Siragos Margaritis the remaining two thousand three hundred and eleven acres which was
designated as L.R. No.3979/2. That land was the subject matter of a management order
which was made on or about 24th March 1973, by the Minister for Agriculture and
Animal Husbandry, pursuant to the provisions of Section 187 of the Agriculture Act, Cap
318, Laws of Kenya, which empowers the Minister, among other things, to occupy and
manage any farm, and thereafter if he considers it beneficial, to transfer the whole or part
of the farm for valuable consideration, but after serving on the registered owner thereof a
fourteen days statutory notice declaring his intention to do so and inviting objections to
the intended sale.
However without any apparent compliance with that provision with regard to notice,
the Minister, on the same day the management order was noted in the land register and
the instrument of title to the land, transferred to Kipsitet Farmers Society Ltd, 596.7
hactares or 1954 acres; and on 15th August 1975 transferred a further 180.2 hactares to
one Joab Henry Onyango Omino, and this left a balance of 392 acres on which lived
several Luo squatter families. Those families were to be forcibly evicted from that land
on 13th December, 1993, by a combined force of regular and administrative policemen
under the supervision of the area District Officer. Samson Omweno.
We received uncontroverted evidence that the several Luo families evicted from L.R.
No.3979/2 were part of a labour force the former European settler owner had on the land
and who were resident there. He had set aside part of his land for their occupation, and
when the aforementioned management order was made they were still living on the land.
Some of the squatters were born and brought up there and knew no other place as home.
The farm in question, which we shall now refer to as Buru farm, unlike other former
European settler farms, was not purchased by the government for the resettlement of
Africans. The Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry on taking over the
management of the farm, decided to make it a livestock holding ground.
The decision was however not implemented because the Luo squatters petitioned the
then Vice-President of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, to intervene, which he did and directed
that the project be abandoned in favour of allowing the squatters to remain on the land.
By its letter dated 11th February, 1978, the Ministry relinquished its interest in Buru farm
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and by a subsequent letter dated 17th February 1978, asked the Director of Settlement to
assist the District Commissioner, of Kericho, in the settlement of the Luo squatters on
Buru farm by sub-diving it and sharing it among them.
That letter was duly copied to the District Commissioner, Kericho, but apart from
asking the squatters to raise some money amounting to about sixty thousand shillings
which they did and deposited the same in the District Treasury, neither he nor his
successors took any further steps towards settling the squatters. Subsequently, upon the
petition of the squatters, the Commissioner of Lands wrote a letter dated 25 September,
1987, to the District Commissioner, Kericho, which
in pertinent part read as follows:
"The Permanent Secretary Ministry of Livestock Development has confirmed that his
ministry no longer requires the above mentioned holding ground and has recommended
that the said land should be allocated to the squatters living on the farm ... all 392 acres
instead of only 200 acres could be used to settle the squatters.".
The letter did not elicit any response from the District Commissioner. In the meantime
the Kipsigis County Council also wrote a letter dated 11th July, 1990, to the District
Commissioner, Kericho, informing him that the land in question belonged to it, and
copied the letter to the Commissioner of Lands who on receipt of it addressed another
letter, dated 28
1993, to the District Commissioner asking him to comment other
claim over the land by the Kipsigis County Council. This time the District Commissioner
responded but in a rather callous, flippant and demeaning manner, in the following
manner:
"The fact that the Ministry of Livestock Development at the time had indicated that
they did not need the plot any more this nevertheless left the plot as government property
which is so up to date. The Government still needs the land for future development.".
It should be noted here that in the Civil Service a District Commissioner is far below
both a Commissioner of Lands and a Permanent Secretary who at all events, are
presumed to know better and in any case are not supposed to be overruled by a
subordinate officer like a District Commissioner.
Moreover, who would have known better, assuming the land belonged to the
government, what use the land would be put to, a District Commissioner or the
Commissioner of Lands whose docket includes looking after government land? Certainly
not the DC.
Yet in this instance he held himself out as not only, knowing better but also, as being
in a position to overrule the Commissioner of Lands and the Permanent Secretary
Ministry of Livestock Development. Be that as it may, the District Commissioner copied
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his letter to the Provincial Commissioner Rift Valley Province, the Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, the Kipsigis County Council and the
District Land Registrar, Kericho.
Surprisingly neither the Commissioner of Lands nor the Permanent Secretary or any
other person intervened to correct or rebuke the District Commissioner. The District Land
Registrar, however, must have been dismayed by the turn of events because in his letter
to the Commissioner of Lands dated 22nd September, 1993, and copied to the District
Commissioner, he sought guidance on what should happen to the squatters, in the
following terms:"Please advise whether the squatters should be resettled on the piece of land (by subdivision); should they continue to squat on the same, or be evicted since their number is
increasing with time.".
The wording of both the District Commissioner's letter to the Commissioner of Lands
and that of the Kipsigis County Council to him, lead to the inevitable conclusion that
there were behind the scenes, manoeuvres by the Provincial Administration at Kericho
and the Kipsigis County Council to dispossess the Luo squatters of the land in question
not for any other reason but because they were Luo and the land originally belonged to
the Kipsigis.
Nicholas Mberia, who was the District Commissioner, Kericho, as at the time the Luo
squatters were evicted, was categorical that upon eviction the squatters were expected to
return to where they originally came from.
Besides, we were told that as at the time the Luo squatters were asked to raise money
to pay for Buru farm a similar proposal was made to a group of Kipsigis in respect of
another piece of land. They, like the Luo squatters, were to raise sixty thousand shillings
which they did and deposited at the District Treasury.
The Provincial Administration quickly assisted them to, have the land transferred to
them and which was eventually sub-divided and shared among them. In view of the
foregoing it is quite clear to us that there was extreme reluctance on the part of the
Provincial Administration to assist the Luo squatters notwithstanding that the then Vice
President, Daniel Arap Moi, had earlier on intervened on their behalf and directed that
they be assisted to settle, presumably permanently, on the subject land.
It would appear to us that the Government had in principle agreed to sell Bum farm to
the Luo squatters because in 1972, the area District Commissioner, Kericho Milton Ole
Ncharo, had, advised them together with Kipsigis squatters who occupied what came to
be known as Chebirir farm, to form separate societies to raise funds to purchase the
respective parcels of land that they occupied.
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The Luo squatters formed the Buru Farmers Society while the Kipsigis formed the
Kipsitet Farmers Society and each Society paid what was required to the District
Treasury. Unlike the Kipsigis who were quickly assisted to acquire their land, no decisive
action was taken by the Provincial Administration to assist the Luo squatters who were
later asked to pay a further twenty one thousand one hundred and eighty shillings and ten
cents which they paid, on the ground that they had delayed in paying the initial sixty
thousand shillings, but that notwithstanding no further action was taken to assist them.
Opposition to their getting Buru farm was first realised in or about 1988, when one
Noah, a Kipsigis, told a baraza at the farm which had been called by the then District
Commissioner, one Onyango, to notify the squatters of plans to sub-divide and share the
farm among them, that the Luo would eventually be evicted from the farm because the
land belonged to the Kipsigis.
In another baraza one Councillor Rotich of the area, remarked that the Luo then living
in the District were milking Kipsigis land. These two and several others were expressing
a view then commonly held by the Kalenjin, that land within their geographical districts
should only be owned by them. We have stated elsewhere in this Report that the Kalenjin
were averse to other tribes living in their midst and that factor, among others, was
exploited to evict the Luo from Thessalia and the areas around it.
The other factor is the political climate of the time. As we stated earlier, 1991 was the
year when the clamour for multi-party politics intensified. The reintroduction of
multiparty democracy balkanised the people in Kenya along ethnic lines and heightened
tribal loyalty and association with the Luo, the Kikuyu and several other non-Kalenjin
tribes being perceived by the Kalenjin as either supporters or sympathisers of opposition
parties and could not, therefore, be trusted.
In this regard, the evidence of Silvanus Ngidi Akelo a resident of Kunyak (Kapkoros)
Location in the neighbouring Division of Chirchila and one who as a member of the
Peace and Reconciliation Committee in his Location, had talked to several Kipsigis, is
instructive.
He reiterated the stand of the Kipsigis that they did not want any other political party
other than Kanu, in their District, and that the Kalenjin were averse to living with other
communities in an area they consider their traditional homeland. This explains how a
tribal aversion was exploited for political reasons to evict the Luo squatters from Buru
farm.
The clashes in Buru farm as indeed, in neighbouring farms occupied by the Luo and
the other non-Kalenjin started on the night of 5th November, 1991. They had spread from
Miteitei farm into Owiro farm in Nandi neighbouring Nyanza Province, and also
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Southwards and Southwest into Kipkelion, Chirchila and Belgut Divisions. Several Luo
houses were set ablaze at night time by people who were believed to be Kalenjin because
their houses were untouched.
The affected families sought and obtained refuge at the nearby Thessalia Free
Pentecostal Fellowship of Kenya Mission. At this time however, only a few houses were
affected, among them those belonging to Perez Odoyo and Magdalina Unoka. A few
Kipsigis suspects were arrested but were released within three days without any charges
being preferred against them.
On 16th November, 1991, several Kipsigis forcibly entered Buru farm and erected
structures at the door steps of the Luo huts. The then District Commissioner, Timothy
Sirma, who seems to have been at the centre of tribal clashes in various parts of the
country was informed and half-heartedly stopped further construction of the huts by the
Kipsigis there. In our view, the erection of the structures by the Kipsigis, was intended to
lay the ground for subsequently, sending security men to evict the Luo from Buru farm.
Thereafter there was relative calm until 20th December, when Alex Orawo's house
was burnt at night, but when the area Chief was notified of it, he is reported to have
remarked callously that the Luo had encroached on Kipsigis land and were expected to
move out.
He did nothing to assist the victims. We think that this incident and the one of 5th
November, 1991, were intended to warn the Luo to move out, but when they persistently
remained in their homes, the Kipsigis, on 7th March, 1992, organised themselves,
invaded Buru farm and burnt about one hundred and forty four Luo houses and sugarcane
and stole several livestock from them. The Luo were thereby rendered homeless and
without any security.
Joseph Runya, William Kumo and one Joslin were among the people who one
Raphael Adero Okwiri identified as the arsonists and stock thieves. Despite the fact that
he made a report at Kericho Police Station naming them specifically as among the
arsonists, no action was taken by the police against them.
The Luo once again sought and got refuge at Thessalia Mission where they camped
living in makeshift structures and tents and in a deplorable state. No assistance from both
the Provincial Administration and the Police Force was extended to them. Various NGOs,
among them Oxfam, National Council of Christian Churches of Kenya (NCCK),
Thessalia Mission, and Red Cross, however, provided relief assistance to them.
Their presence there must have embarrassed the Government because on 21st March
1992, a Lady District Officer was sent there in company of the area Chief, Musa Koech,
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who advised the refugees to return to their respective homes in Buru farm. This they did
and with the assistance of the aforementioned organisations reconstructed their homes.
For at least one year thereafter they lived peacefully. However, in April, 1993,
uncertainty and tension among them was heightened when, at a baraza at the farm, the
now notorious Timothy Sirma, at the prompting of one Sulumet, gave the Luo squatters a
three weeks notice to quit the farm or face dire consequences. Neither he nor the area
Chief were willing to discuss the issue.
Timothy Sirma, allegedly told the squatters to move either to Thessalia Mission or to
Nyanza. It seems to us that Timothy Sirma was unhappy that the Thessalia Mission had
earlier assisted the squatters, otherwise there is no logical explanation as to why he told
them to move to Thessalia Mission.
Timothy Sirma was, however, transferred before the period of the quit notice expired,
and was replaced by another Kalenjin, Nicholas Mberia, as District Commissioner,
Kericho. At first when the Luo squatters petitioned him to rescind the, notice he appeared
sympathetic and caring because he eventually obliged them. He is also alleged to have
assured them that having lived on the land for more than ten years the law protected them
against eviction.
However, two or so months later his attitude changed. By his letter of 28th July, 1993,
to the Commissioner of Lands he adopted a stand which was diametrically opposed to the
interests of the squatters, and in December, 1993, he caused the area District Officer,
Samson Omweno and the area Chief, Musa Koech to notify the squatters to leave the
area, according to Raphael Adero, Okwiri, within 18 hours and that if they failed to move
out, they would "see red berets."
They did not move and the notice was repeated by Nicholas Mberia, on Jamhuri day,
namely 12th December, 1993. But the Chief, Musa Koech, Samson Omweno, and
Nicholas Mberia all testified that at that time, there was nobody living on Buru farm that
the Luo squatters had been driven out in the course of the 1992 clashes and that the
alleged eviction of Luo squatters was a misnomer for all that happened in their view, was
that the several Luo huts which had since 1992 been standing there empty, were
demolished because they had become a hideout for criminals.
The events preceding 13th December, 1993, when a contingent of armed regular and
administration policemen went to Buru farm with two bulldozers, and flattened most Luo
houses there do not support their lying testimony. It was not disputed that in April, 1993,
Timothy Sirma, notified the Luo squatters to move out of Buru farm within three weeks.
It was also not disputed that Nicholas Mberia, rescinded that notice, and that on, Jamhuri
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day of that year, he warned the squatters to leave "government land" or else face dire
consequences.
If indeed, there were no people on the land it would not have been necessary to issue
those notices and warnings. Besides the District Security Committee's Minutes dated 24th
September, 993, (Exhibit 162) show that the issue of the Luo squatters on Buru farm was
discussed. Besides, the then Officer Commanding Police Division during the material
time period, Julius Kiptagat arap Soi, testified that the District Security Committee
discussed the eviction of the Luo squatters subsequently after the 1992 clashes and when
Nicholas Mberia gave instructions that the Luo squatters should be evicted. We have no
doubt that the Provincial Administration led by Nicholas Mberia, were the ones who
planned and carried out the eviction using about twenty nine armed policemen, as
resistance was anticipated from the Luo squatters.
Nicholas Mberia, in his evidence tried to explain why the issue of the Luo squatters
was discussed at the District Security Committee. His explanation, which did not impress
us at all, was that the continued presence of the Luo in Buru farm area, was generally
causing tension between them and the Kipsigis as the latter did not want them there
because they, unlike the Luo who were opposition supporters, were Kanu supporters who
felt that the Luo were abusing the hospitality they had extended to them as "foreigners."
His evidence on this issue which is contained in the verbatim report of the proceedings of
the Judicial Commission of 25th May, 1999, is partly as follows:
"Mr. Mberia: My Lords, I decided to evict them on security grounds. Mr. Chunga: On
security grounds?
Mr. Mberia: Yes, after we had seen signs that those people were going to fight. Ours was
to try and pre-empty the occurrence of clashes as there had been in other parts of the
district.
Mr. Chunga: Would it not have been a better option to provide security to avert the
clashes while you investigated the history and the dispute over Theland?
Mr. Mberia: My Lords, it was not possible to do so at that time. As I have said, we had a
problem in our neighbouring districts in Nakuru, and most of our security men had been
sent to those parts to assist. So, sending two or three security men to the ground, would
also have been endangering their lives, in the event of eruption of fighting. So, we did not
see that as an alternative.
Justice Bosire: Yes, but you had sent 30 askaris to evict those people. Mr. Chairman: And
two bulldozers, too.
Mr. Mberia: My Lords, for the operation, we had to borrow askaris do the job and go
back to their stations.".
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He had earlier stated in the same proceedings that:
"Mr Mberia: After that it came to a time when there was the agitation again around
Muhoroni area. The Kipsigis and the Luo were starting to fight at the shops in Muhoroni.
Justice Bosire: When was this time you had incidents of
fighting at Muhoroni market?
Mr Mberia: I think it was around October/November, my Lords. It is too long ago and
I cannot remember. Mr Chunga: 1991? Mr Mberia: 1993.
Mr Chunga: Continue. Mr. Mberia: Around the beginning of December the incidents
escalated whereby the Kipsigis started burning huts belonging to the Luo and vice versa.
Mr. Chunga: How did the political differences come about? Mr Mberia: It was the
general saving at that time that the Ford-K at that time was mainly Luo and Kanu was for
the Kipsigis. The utterance's made the Kipsigis feel that the Luo were now not friendly to
them and that they were not supporting them and therefore they should not stay in their
land. That is the information which we got.".
The events Nicholas Mberia was describing did not occur in 1993, but in 1991 and
early 1992. There had been relative peace in Thessalia for at least a year and besides, the
District Security Committee minutes for the relevant period do not support his testimony.
Moreover, Julius Kiptugut Arap Soi, testified that no report was made at any of the police
stations or posts then under him about the burning of houses at Buru
farm.
As already indicated the invasion of Buru farm by the Kipsigis in early 1992, was
intended to create a ruse for police action against the Luo. The foregoing untruthful
evidence of Nicholas Mberia was merely the excuse for employing armed policemen to
drive out the Luo from land which the government had decided to settle them on.
Nicholas Mberia's behaviour, was a mischievous, blatant and uncaring approach to a nonissue and on a matter he had no business to enter into, one between the squatters, the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Lands department. His behaviour as indeed that of his
predecessor Timothy Sirma, was that of an accomplice in the clashes.
For instance, when Nicholas Mberia wrote the letter dated 16 th August, 1993, which
we reproduced earlier, he was categorical that LR. No.3979/2 was government land, a
fact he knew was not so. For in his oral testimony before us, he confessed the truth when
he admitted that at the time he wrote that letter, he was aware. that the Ministry of
Agriculture had relinquished its interest in Buru farm.
If he was aware that the Ministry of Agriculture had relinguished its interest in land
which belonged to a private individual, then it could not possibly remain government
land.

30

Curiously, however, Nicholas Mberia, on 6th November, 1995, about two years after
the Luo, squatters had been evicted from Buru farm, wrote to the District Lands Officer,
inter alia, boasting that "we" had evicted squatters from the subject land, and additionally,
seeking to know under which organization the land was registered. This is what he said in
the letter:
"R: No.3979/2 KIPSITET KERICHO:
The above quoted piece of land is the famous Thessalia plot where we recently evicted
the squatters from it. I would like as a matter of urgency to know under which
organization this land was/is registered for my further action. Please treat as most
urgent.".
The letter was, we think, written with tongue in cheek, because if surely he did not
know who was the registered owner he would not have acted the way he did, namely
causing the Luo squatters to be evicted. One would have expected that the. starting point
before any eviction is carried out was to satisfy oneself as to the ownership of the land
involved. Otherwise there would be the obvious danger of evicting people from land
which belongs to them.
The eviction of the Luo from Thessalia on 13th December, 1993, was carried out in a
cruel and inhuman manner. The people were surprised at daybreak by armed policemen,
who woke them up and ordered them to leave immediately. They were not allowed time
or opportunity to remove their personal effects. Two bulldozers with government
registration marks were used, and all but a few houses were flattened. Families were
rendered homeless, and were forced, for the third time, to seek refuge at Thessalia
Mission. May be the policemen who effected the eviction were the "red berets" which the
squatters had prophetically been told would remove them from the land.
Two factors make the eviction bizarre. The Luo squatters along with the Kipsigis had
been told in or about 1970 to raise money to buy the respective parcels of land they were
living on. Each group was to raise sixty thousand shilling's notwithstanding that the two
pieces of land they were to buy were unequal.
The Kipsigis were to buy about 1954 acres, while the Luo were initially to buy 200
acres which later was upped to 392 acres. The two parcels of land were almost abutting
each other and one wouid not possibly argue that their quality differed.
Secondly, on completing payment the Kipsigil were quickly assisted to have the land
transfer to them, and which was subdivided and shared among themselves without any
obstacle. However, with regard to the Luo squatters, notwithstanding that they paid much
more money than the Kipsigis for land which was about a fifth of what the latter got, no
steps were taken to assist them.
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The Government to this day is holding their money, its servants kicked them out of
Buru farm and many now live in abject poverty, not because they are lazy but because
they were uprooted from where they were lawfully eking for themselves a living.
Not content with his eviction of the Luo squatters from Buru farm, Nicholas Mberia,
the big bully, followed the Luo squatters to Thessalia Mission and primary school where
they had camped, and evicted them for the second time, on the pretext that the school was
about to reopen and the school grounds were required for this purpose.
That may well have been the case. However, the evidence we received was that the
Luo squatters were attacked not on the school grounds but at the mission compound
where they were encamped and where their presence did not obstruct anyone. In the
course of this attack one Luo squatter was killed and several others were injured. The
missionaries were threatened, harassed arid warned because they had tried to assist the
squatters; and properties were either damaged or stolen. After this all the missionaries
left, and we were told that the mission and the hospital there had to sadly close down.
The case of Buru farm is a clear example in which both the Provincial Administration
and the security forces, oblivious of the damage that their action would cause to the
image of the Government, acted against innocent citizens of this country for the political
reasons, and the economic benefit of a few undisclosed persons.
Sondu is a town strategically situated at the border of the Rift Valley and Nyanza
Provinces, and the meeting point of three Districts, namely, Kericho, Kisumu and
Nyamira in which lives the Kipsigis, the Luo and the Kisii tribes respectively. The built
up area is however astride the common border of Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces.
The market place of the town although one, has two sections, one on the Kericho side
and the other on the Kisumu side. The Kisumu-Kisii highway passes through the town.
The town is also connected to Kericho town by a murram, road which passes through
Kiptere and Sosiot which are trading centres.
Sondu being strategically situated, its market is generally well attended on market
days which fall on, among other days, Fridays. Clashes in the town started on 6th March,
1992, a Friday, and pitted the Kipsigis against the Luo, and also affected the Kisii. We
were told that the clashes started at the market place, on the Kericho side, when George
Manyala, a Luo hawker in a Ford T-shirt, refused to pay the market cess to a Kipsigis
County Council Market Master one Koske, a Kipsigis, because he would not be given as
he wanted a Ford-Kenya cess receipt.
As Koske and David Mwendwa Momanyi, one of his two assistants, tried to force
George Manyala to pay the cess, it was said that George Manyala drew a knife and
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stabbed David Momanyi. The incident caused a stampede and commotion and George
Manyala was heard in dholuo shouting for help.
The Luo at the market rushed to his help. The Kipsigis on seeing the Luo rush to
Manyala's aid and thinking mistakenly though, that the Luo had gone to attack Koske, the
Market Master, also rushed there to assist him. Fighting ensued leading to several
casualties. This story was given by Koske and was to some degree corroborated by his
second assistant, Peter Ondieki. Peter Ondieki, was however, categorical that the incident
was not the cause of the skirmishes in Sondu.
That was one side of the story. There was however, the other side of it which was
given by Arthur Ondu Oging a Luo, who told us that on the material day on his way to
Sondu he met about twenty Kipsigis, who were strangely dressed in red T-shirts and with
red and brown head bands around their heads and armed with bows and arrows, lying
down along the side of the road, about a kilometre or two from Sondu but on the Kericho
side. On reaching Sondu he found fighting in progress between the Luo who were armed
with slings and people similarly dressed and armed as those he had seen lying down by
the roadside, on his way to the town.
The out-numbered policemen from Sondu Police Station, which is on the Kericho side
of the town could not quell the skirmishes and asked for reinforcement. Later a
contingent of GSU, regular and Administrative policemen from both Nyanza and Rift
Valley Provinces arrived and stopped the fighting. We were told that slings are easy to
make and those being used by the Luo must have been made soon after fighting started.
Not so, however, for the bows and arrows.
They are not such items that can be quickly made. For the Kipsigis to have had and
used them on that day means that they must have come with them. Arthur Ondu Oging, in
his testimony, as contained in the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial
Commission of 1st March, 1999, stated inter alia, as follows:
"I think even if Manyala did not put on a T-shirt something would have happened on
that day because these people (Kalenjin) were organized before that fight started.".
He added that the Kipsigis raiders must have come from outside the general
neighbourhood of Sondu as those he saw were strangers to him, and that had they been
from the neighbourhood of the town he would have identified them, at least by
appearance.
It should also be noted that on the day fighting broke out at Sondu it was only a day
after clashes had erupted in Thessalia and its neighbouring areas. The clashes at Sondu
appear to us to have been purely a political reaction by the Kipsigis at the reintroduction
of plural politics, and were an extension of the clashes in neighbouring Thessalia.

33

We also think they were intended to confuse the real reason for the clashes in
Thessalia and other neighbouring areas. David Momanyi or Peter Ondieki told us that
from his observation, the Kipsigis had a hidden agenda as on the material day they came
uniformly dressed in T-shirts with head bands and armed with bows and arrows, emerged
suddenly, apparently from a hideout, unto the market on hearing the screams pre arranged
and well timed of a woman in the market.
In Molo South and Njoro, as we shall see later, strange people were seen in those
areas before clashes erupted implying that there was a group which was organized as a
militia which was being used to start the violence.
It is also noteworthy that the raiders at Sondu appeared regimented which meant that
the clashes in Sondu were not only, premeditated but were also, well organised and
executed. We were told that for this purpose, the raiders were dropped near Sondu by
matatus but their owners denied this, implying that if at all, the raiders had been
transported to near the market, this was done in the ordinary course of their business as
transporters.
Several people died as a result of the clashes in Sondu. Three bodies were recovered
the next day floating on Sondu-Miriu river which passes through the town, and were
identified as two Kipsigis and a Kisii. Other bodies were recovered on the third day,
which brought the total of those dead to at least ten.
Although the clashes in Sondu town did not last more than one day, they spread to the
outskirts of the town and its hinterland. For instance, several houses were burnt at
Komolong in Kericho District and several others on 7th March, 1992, at Holo in Kisumu
District, where there was a clash between armed Kipsigis youth numbering about five
hundred and, armed Luo youths numbering at least two hundred.
Six Luo, including one Ongus Abila, and an ex-policemen called Mbori Tambo were
among the casualties, the latter having been killed in his homestead by Kalenjin youths.
Later, four human skeletons believed to have been those of Kipsigis were found on the
battle ground.
Like happened at Sondu market, the police who were in the neighbourhood did not
immediately intervene to stop the fighting because they were greatly outnumbered by the
combatants. It was after reinforcement came that the clashes were stopped in the area,
and since then they have not been repeated.
In our introductory remarks regarding the clashes in the Rift Valley Province, we
stated that during the clashes the provincial security forces invariably arrived late at the
scenes of the clashes, were generally ineffective and largely looked to and depended on
the Provincial Administration to give them directions on security operations, and that that
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tended to slow down their action against the raiders. We were told that in Kericho,
between November, 1991, and April, 1992, the police were reasonably effective.
However, thereafter, although they would be seen in the clash areas they did little, if at
all, to quell the clashes. In some cases they stood by watching events unfold, on the
ground that their superiors had instructed them not to shoot at the raiders. For instance on
7th March, 1992, at Holo area at the border of Kisumu and Kericho Districts, security
personnel watched as the Kipsigis and Luo youths fought. They saw two badly injured
persons both of them Luo, one of whom was Mbori Tambo, but did nothing to assist
them.
They refused to accede to a request made to them to take the two to hospital with the
result that the two died, one before reaching hospital, and the other soon after his arrival
there. Eliud Opiyo Nyangwe, the then Assistant Chief of South Nyakach sub-location,
who witnessed the incident, testified that instead of the security men helping to stop the
fight, they drove away leaving the youths fighting. More than five people were killed
before another team of policemen, which eventually stopped the fighting, arrived.
In other instances, the police would arrest people but later release them without
preferring any charges against them, or where any charges were preferred, the suspects
were released on flimsy excuses. For example, the officer commanding, Sondu Police
Station, Johnson Nyagah, told us that during the clashes at Sondu market and
neighbouring areas, several people were arrested and charged for various offences.
Those charges were however withdrawn because "no complainants came forward".
The suspects, whose particulars were entered in the station's occurrence book, were
arrested looting various shops and had a motor vehicle Reg. No. KZB 882, in which they
planned to carry away the loot. The vehicle was, however, later unconditionally released
to its owner.
It is quite strange that the police instead of looking for the complainants whose shops
were looted, sat back and waited for them to come to the police station to complain. In
Miteitei, a similar excuse was given by the Officer Commanding the Songhor Police
Station. The police handled the clashes in a half-hearted manner and it seems to us that
they had instructions from some quarter against taking any serious action against the
raiders.
We heard evidence from the officer Commanding the Londiani Police Station, Peter
Ouma Ochola that in or about November, 1991 he, together with forty or so other police
officers ambushed over one thousand raiders who crossed from Tinderet Division in
Nandi District into Londiani and Burnt Forest areas. At the request of the District
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Commissioner of Uasin Gishu District, Paul Lagat, the suspects were handed over to
Oscar Wakhisi, the Officer Commanding the Tarakwa Police Station in that District.
Those raiders were not charged nor is there any record on what happened to them.
Peter Ochola was recalled as a witness to clarify the issue. At first, he was categorical
that he had made a note in his station's occurrence book and added that on an earlier
occasion when he could not be reached to testify, he had checked the occurrence book
and saw the note he had made about the handing over of those suspects to the Officer
Commanding the Tarakwa Police Station.
We gave him time to go back to Londiani Police Station to check all the occurrence
books for the relevant period which he did, but he could not find the entry. He was,
however, not able to get one occurrence book, for the period August to December, 1991,
and it is our view that the entry must have been made in that book. Our conclusion is
supported by what his Officer Commanding Police Division, Eliud Langat, said, namely
that on his return from Britain, where he had been attending a course, he was briefed
about suspects who had been arrested within his police division but were handed over to
a police station in another Division to wit Tarakwa Police Station. He could not have
been briefed about them if it was just a minor matter or if the incident had not taken
place.
It is also unthinkable that Peter Ochola, could have on his own volition transferred
suspects to a police station in another District and police division without being directed
to do so by a superior officer. This is an example of a case in which a provincial
administrator gave directions to the police on the handling of criminal suspects and we
think the police improperly listened to him. Criminal investigations are matters which the
police should have a free hand in handling as only they have the power and personnel to
do so.
Although the District Commissioner, Paul Langat, denied it in a written statement
which was submitted to us, the evidence we have set out above, does show otherwise. We
observed the demeanour of Peter Ochola and we think that as a witness he was interfered
with after some indication was given for his recall. We also think that somebody must
have obstructed our investigation on the issue as the occurrence book for the relevant
period could not be traced.
The behaviour of certain Provincial Administration officers and the Police Force, too,
suggests that the clashes had their support. We were told that during the clashes at
Koguta and Kunyak, in 1991, the area District Commissioner, Timothy Sirma, ordered
policemen from Koru Police Station in Nyanza, to return to their station because
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according to him they had no business crossing the border into Kericho. This was at the
height of the clashes in the area.
His behaviour was clearly reminiscent of a person who condoned the clashes. His
successor, Nicholas Mberia, ruthlessly and inhumanly evicted the Luo squatters on Buru
Hill on ethnic and political grounds. These two officers should be investigated regarding
their role in the clashes.
There was also the conduct of Eliud Langat, a Deputy Commissioner of Police, who in
November, 1991, was the Officer Commanding Police Division, Kericho. Jonathan
Kibaibai Rogony, Chief of Mutaragon Location in Kipkelion, told us that while in the
company of the members of the District Security Committee which included Eliud
Langat and the District Commissioner, Joseph Mutemi, and together with some
policemen, they visited Kipkelion at the height of the clashes where they saw at Kibinet,
a group of about fifty people gathered on Chakoror hill.
Eliud Langat, a Kalenjin, then rather strangely quickly left the group and without
asking any one for help, quickly ran uphill alone to where the people were. When he was
asked about it his unconvincing response as contained in the verbatim report of the
proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 31st May, 1999 were as follows:
"Langat: My Lords, I had a job to do and I thought that by going after those youths, if
I caught up with them then I would have solved a problem in one way or the other.".
At least two things may be said about the behaviour of Eliud Lagat. He was the
seniormost police officer in Kericho District police Division and was expected to direct
police operations there. Behaving as though he was under the command of another
officer, he left his junior officers and police constables behind and, in what we think was
pretended heroism, ran up to confront a large gang of people. We think that there
was something he did not want others that he was with, to know, possibly that he knew
the people on the hill and their motive for being there. His testimony was that he met
seven youths who he arrested, but the fact that the youths did not run away on seeing him
laboriously running up hill, speaks volumes about his relationship with them. The
second point we would like to make about him is that, if his statement that he arrested
only seven youths is to be accepted, it is strange why he, a senior police officer, would
arrest people he had no evidence against. That the seven were later released, is clear
testimony that his pretended arrest of them was merely to fake seriousness on his part in
dealing with the clashes.
It is noteworthy that those arrested, like him, were Kalenjin and according to Jonathan
Rogony they were twenty in number and were armed with assorted weapons and carried
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match boxes, a fact that Eliud Langat denied in the following manner as shown In the
verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 31st May, 1999:
"My Lords, what I may have seen may not necessarily be what the chief had also seen.
He testified on what lie had seen, and I am also testifying on what I had seen...The youths
I chased were not in uniform. I persuaded the youths to accompany me down the hill.
They accepted.".
The two witnesses having been together it is not possible that they would have seen
the arrested youths in different dispositions and number. The disparity in the number of
the youths as given by both witnesses is quite big which makes us conclude that Eliud
Langat withheld the truth from us on that score. He too, should be investigated regarding
his role in the clashes in Kericho.
The foregoing are only examples of the attitude and behaviour of both the Police
Force and Provincial Administration. In view of that, the evidence of some of them who
testified that they were hampered in their operations due to lack of information and
limited personnel, is not believable.
It seems to us that they knew and condoned what was going on, and whatever they did
in purported stoppage of the clashes was intended to hoodwink the victims of the clashes
and the world in general. That will, we think, explain the suddenness of the clashes, their
systematic spread, and abrupt end in each of the areas so far considered.
UASIN GISHU DISTRICT
Uasin Gishu has a large population of former squatters and workers on European farms.
who were settled there under the aegis of the Commissioner for Squatters. They ,ere more
particularly settled on what is now referred to as Kondoo farms, numbered I to IX, which
were formerly managed by the Central Agricultural Board.
There were also other settlement farms under the aegis of the Settlement Fund
Trustees. The various communities settled there between 1963 and 1970. The clashes in
the District, which is bordered by Nandi, Kericho, Koibatek, Trans Nzoia and Kakamega
Districts, were mainly confined to Ainabkoi Division which is the home of a large
population of Kikuyu, among other tribes.
Ainabkoi Division is bisected in a North-South direction by the Eldoret-Nairobi road
which passes through Burnt Forest town, sometimes referred to as Olare, and Timboroa
Shopping Centre. Ainabkoi Division borders both Tinderet Division, where Miteitei farm
is, and Londiani Division in Kericho District. For some reason the October/November,
1991 clashes which affected Tinderet and Kipkelion Divisions in Kericho District did not
affect Ainabkoi.

38

Chief Inspector of Police, Peter Ochola, who was then the Officer Commanding the
Londiani Police Station, it will be recalled, told us that while, in the company of forty
other policemen, intercepted a gang of over one thousand armed Kalenjiin raiders, in or
about November 1991, as they were about to cross into Londiani and Ainabkoi Divisions
from Tinderet. That is perhaps why no clashes were experienced in Ainabkoi in 1991.
Prior to December, 1992, when clashes first erupted in Ainabkoi, the different
communities in the area lived in peace with each other, and although there existed
isolated cases of land disputes among some shareholders in some farms, they did not take
a tribal angle or the dimension which the dispute at Miteitei farm took.
It also appears that the clashes which occurred in neighbouring Tinderet Division and
parts of neighbouring Kericho District did not affect the inter-ethnic relationship among
the various communities in Ainabkoi. Otherwise the history of the area prior to 1992,
unlike the other areas we have already covered was uneventful and we do not propose to
say more on it.
199. The clashes in Burnt Forest area, started on 13th December, 1992, two or so
weeks before the general elections of that year, and a year after the introduction of multi-partyism in Kenya. Prior to the clashes there had been reports of tension between the
Nandi and the Kikuyu which it was claimed was caused by, firstly, increased cases of
stock theft of Kikuyu livestock in Rugiri farm by the Kalenjin. Secondly, there were
allegedly increased cases of Kalenjin livestock crossing onto Kikuyu farms and
destroying their crops, which the Kikuyu regarded as deliberate and intended to annoy
them. All this led to mutual accusations that one or the other tribe was planning to attack
the other.
But the clashes when they came, did not start in either Rugiri or Bayete but at
Usalama Shopping Centre where most of the businesses and the business and residential
premises, there were owned by the Kikuyu. The raiders who were believed to be the
Kalenjin, armed with bows and arrows with their faces painted to conceal their identities,
were well organized and came in large numbers. The attack at Usalama was almost
simultaneous with another attack by the Kalenjin at Geiti farm, which was also
predominantly occupied by the Kikuyu.
Two people were killed at Usalama and two at Geiti, and several others were injured
in both places. Several Kikuyu houses and shops were looted and then burnt. There was
a similar attack at Burnt Forest Town itself, where Tarakwa Police Station was situated,
and during which, several business premises and motor vehicles owned by the Kikuyu
were burnt.
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The few policemen at Tarakwa Police Station did not at all attempt to stop the arson
allegedly because of their depleted numbers, but we think that that was merely an excuse
given for not bothering to take any action at all to stop the violence. The Kikuyu then
organized themselves and made retaliatory attacks on the Kalenjin in the town.
They burnt several Kalenjin shops and motor vehicles and a Kalenjin, Samson
Busieni, who was a businessman in the town, was beheaded. The other Kalenjin business
people fled and sought refuge in Olare Guest House owned by Samuel Ngelel, a Kalenjin.
The clashes then spread to several farms with mixed communities.
All the non-Kalenjin fled their farms and settled mainly in Burnt Forest, Usalama, and
other Trading Centres where they camped in schools and churches. A few Kalenjin
whose houses were burnt in the retaliatory attacks, fled and sought refuge in
neighbouring farms predominantly occupied by fellow Kalenjin.
The clashes, in Uasin Gishu District in December, 1992, coincided with the campaigns
for the multi-party general and presidential elections to be held that month. The clashes
were eventually stopped before the polling day which was on 29th, December.
But on 30th March, 1993, the clashes erupted again more or less in similar fashion as
before. These too were stopped, and there was relative peace until 23rd August, 1993,
when over forty armed Kalenjin youths attacked and killed five Kikuyu, allegedly
because they had stolen their livestock.
We were told that some of the Kikuyu used firearms and hand grenades to repulse
their attackers and this and a similar alleged incident in Molo South, we think, must have
forced the Government to declare Burnt Forest, Londiani and Molo, security operation
zones on 2nd September 1993.
Regarding the action by the Provincial Administration and the Police Force, to stop
the clashes, the Officer Commanding Tarakwa Police Station, Oscar Wakhisi, told us that
he had mobilized his men just before clashes broke out when he had been told of tension
building up between the Kalenjin in Bayete farm and the Kikuyu in Rugiri farm, and that
while he was attending to this he saw houses burning at Geiti Usalama/Nyakinyua farms
and at Usalama Trading Centre where he arrived too late to stop people being killed and
injured, and properties being looted and others destroyed. There was thus, not much he
could do to stop the clashes.
He stated further that he telephoned his Officer Commanding Police Division, Jama
Warsame, and requested for reinforcement but there was delay in getting it, and when it
eventually came the harm had already been done more or less beyond repair. Fourteen
Kikuyu, eight Kalenjin, one Luo and four unidentified people were reported killed, and
several others were injured in the skirmishes.
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The security forces arrested sixty five people, all except one who were Kalenjin.
Among those arrested were two police officers because it was alleged that they were
involved in the incidents of looting and arson. The majority of those arrested were found
armed with traditional weapons like bows and arrows.
Oscar Wakhisi said that apart from the report of tension between the Kikuyu and
the Kalenjin on Rugiri and Bayete farms he did not have any other prior report or
knowledge of the impending clashes. The effectiveness of the Special Branch there at the
time was doubtful in view of what other witnesses told us that prior to the clashes in
December, 1992, the Kalenjin had been talking about evicting the Kikuyu from the area
because of their reluctance to support Kanu.
That Oscar Wakhisi denied having had any prior knowledge of the clashes suggests
that there was limited, if any, flow of information among the different security arms, and
between the people and those units or that though the Special Branch had prior
information, they, as was the case in the Coast Province, and in support of the clashes,
kept the information to themselves.
There is also the fact that as soon as Oscar Wakhisi got information about tension
between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu he immediately notified the District Officer of the
area, Paul Cheruiyot. Oscar Wakhisi's behaviour in this regard, showed that the police
considered themselves as an appendage of and subject to, the Provincial Administration.
This was so notwithstanding what the former Commissioner of Police, Duncan
Wachira, had to say about the relationship between the Provincial Administration and the
Police Force which appears in. the verbatim report of the proceedings of the Judicial
Commission of 4th June, 1999, namely that:
"The Provincial Administration have no legal authority to give orders on use of
firearms. Their role remains to co-ordinate and to oversee the security operations in their
respective areas. The police remain in charge of operations, giving orders and acting
when the situation demands. The conflict on the ground is unfortunate.".
But this aside, the security forces did not act decisively to prevent or stop the
clashes. We were told, and this was a common feature in almost all the clash areas, that
security men instead of firing at the raiders with a view to disabling them so that they can
be arrested merely fired in the air. Senior Chief Philip Kiptuk Kiskei told us that in his
Ollainguise Location which borders Miteitei, he witnessed an incident at Kitingia
Shopping Centre where Kalenjin youth armed with bows and arrows, engaged Kikuyu
youth who were armed with stones.
There were three armed Administrative Policemen nearby who instead of firing at the
combatants, only fired their guns in the air. The combatants were not moved one bit by
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the firing and continued fighting during which more than ten people were killed, six
Kikuyu and five Kalenjin.
Prior to the reintroduction of plural politics in Kenya at the end of the 1991, the area
KANU member of Parliament, was John Tarar. In 1992, however, there was a strong
opposition element in Burnt Forest area. Ezekiel Kibii Cheruiyot, the Chief of Olare
Location testified that, Tarar would have had a hard time recapturing his seat in the 1992
general elections had his only opponent, who was contesting on an opposition ticket, not
withdrawn his candidature at the last minute. This perhaps will explain the timing of the
clashes in 1992 and why violence targeted the Kikuyu and other non Kalenjin
communities who were perceived as opposition supporters. It is notable that during the
elections Councillor Kirua of Ford Kenya, was elected the area Councillor.
The same witness testified that fifteen per cent of the people in his Location did not
cast their votes because they had been displaced by the inter-ethnic violence. Only
KANU stood to gain if opposition supporters and sympathizers were displaced from
voting during the general election of that year.
NAKURU DISTRICT
Nakuru District, an expansive, multi-ethnic District with its administrative headquarters
at Nakuru and which is also the headquarters of the Rift Valley Province, was the most
hard hit by the inter-tribal clashes of 1991 to 1998. The District is bounded role by
Narok District to the South, Nyandarua District to the East, Baringo and Koibatek
Districts to the North, and Kericho and Bomet Districts to the West. Nakuru District was
part of what used to be the White Highlands, but unlike other Districts we have already
considered Nakuru District did not in colonial times, have native reserves.
Its present residents therefore, moved there under different settlement programmes,
some of which were started before independence. By the end of 1961, there were about
forty thousand Africans in Nakuru and about one hundred and
sixty thousand in the farms in the District which, according to the Annual Report for
Nakuru, 1961 more than fifty percent were the Kikuyu. At independence, therefore, there
was a very high percentage of the Kikuyu population in Nakuru District, and their
presence there, both before and after independence was a constant source of problems not
only with the settler population but also, with other tribes who like them were resident in
the district for various reasons.
Elsewhere in this Report we said that the Rift Valley Province was the ancestral home
of pastoral tribes, who were moved out to create room for European settlements. The
Kipsigis and the Nandi who were among those tribes, have over the years laid claim to
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the whole of the Rift Valley Province. They as also the other Kalenjin tribes have always
detested control of their ancestral land by outsiders, whether economically or politically.
For instance in The 1961 Annual Report for Nakuru contains the following relevant
statement:
"Inter-tribal tensions increased markedly as the year wore on. The Kalenjin make no
secret of the fact that they are stock-piling native arms against the inevitable day probably
after independence, when they will have to fight the Kikuyu and perhaps the Luo for
control of their own areas, including the upper and middle Rift.
The tribal antipathies are now so great on some farms that the Kalenjin members of
the Agricultural Workers' Union would refuse to take part in a union strike alongside
Kikuyu members and would automatically take the opposite line in any controversy.".
The above excerpt looked at with hindsight was prophetic as during the clashes in
Nakuru District and elsewhere the Kikuyu and the Luo were the major targets of attack
by the Kalenjin.
The Kalenjin and the Kikuyu, it now seems to us, had more or less become traditional
enemies. Like the Kalenjin, the Maasai in the Mau Narok area were as far back as the late
1950s against the Kikuyu coming to live in their area. However, unlike the Kalenjin, the
Maasai were not so hostile to the Kikuyu.
Prior to independence there were no marked tribal differences other than those we
have stated above. However, Nakuru District was the most politically conscious District
in the whole of the Rift Valley Province, to the extent that by 1962, there were about
eleven political and quasi-political registered societies; most which were tribally based.
The political situation on the introduction of multipartyism in Kenya, in 1991, was
similar, and it seems to us that Kenyans have changed little, if at all, in their political and
general approach to issues. We thus consider the following observation which appears in
the 1960 Annual Report, for Nakuru, as an apt comment:
"An African's first loyalty is to his family and tribe rather than a political party or
other non-tribal organization. As general elections approached political loyalty became
more and more synonymous with tribal loyalty. The main line-ups were Kikuyu/Luo for
KANU and the Kalenjin/Abaluhya for KADU."
In post independence Kenya and more particularly in Nakuru District, opposition
politics had been unwelcome. For instance, in 1965, the Nakuru District Ex-freedom
fighters had to organize a meeting in addition to raising funds to purchase land, to refute
insinuations that they were secretly supporting the opposition. Such insinuations by
KANU stalwarts against opponents within KANU have not been uncommon in the print
and electronic media. Infact during the KANU majimbo rallies at Kapsatet, Kaptatet and
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Narok, which we referred to earlier, the virulent attacks by the speakers were directed
against those in KANU who had become proponents of plural politics. The late Chepkok,
for instance, is reported in the Sunday Nation of 22nd September, 1991, to have said the
following about multiparty proponents:
"Hit them hard wherever they are."
And William Ole Ntimama was reported in the Sunday Nation of 29th September,
1991, as having told the Narok rally that:
"We have now buried the FORD, multiparty politics and the NDP. All the Ministers
and KANU leaders you see here have resolved to fight together and follow President Moi
together..."
Majimbo was here at the time of independence and was done away with; if majimbo
ended, multiparty politics should also end - or else."
Other speakers used words to the same effect including also that violence could be
used to resist multiparty politics. The use of such violent and unsavoury language when it
comes from leaders and more particularly, political leaders, who generally are regarded
as opinion shapers, tend to easily stir up the populace more so where as happened in
1991, issues are presented in a slanted manner with a view to misleading and inciting an
unsuspecting and simple people.
The majority of the parliamentarians in Nakuru, during the one party era having been
Kikuyu, we think that the clamour for multi-party politics raised a feeling of unease and
suspicion among the Kalenjin politicians, who as some witnesses said, felt that the
position of their own tribesman as President was threatened by the Kikuyu who were in
the forefront of the clamour for multi-party democracy. This perhaps would plain why
Nakuru District which then had a high non-Kalenjin population was hit hardest by the
intertribal clashes of 1991 to 1998.
We earlier discussed how the various ethnic groups got land in the White Highlands or
scheduled areas. The resettlement programme brought together people from different
ethnic backgrounds, who, in due time, came to know and relate well with each other and
to share common views in social, economic, educational and political matters for a long
time before the clashes.
However, with the advantage of hindsight it would seem that the different tribes did
not accept each other but only tolerated each other as apparently there were deep seated
ethnic ambitions and prejudices which were activated by political events preceding the
1992, general election.
The new settlements in Nakuru District did not take any particular pattern. In some
cases however, the farms were bought by tribally based land buying companies and
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societies with the result that in those farms one would find occupants wholly from one
ethnic community.
However, as at the time of the clashes in 1992, the scenario was gradually changing.
We were told that some of the shareholders had sold their shares in some farms to other
people either from their own of other tribe and thus promoted tribal integration.
We were not told of any land disputes in the settlement farms, which were of the same
or greater intensity as that which had existed at Miteitei farm in Nandi District. And so at
the onset of the tribal clashes in 1992, most farm owners in Nakuru District were happily
settled on their farms and the clashes came as a shock to them.
The clashes in Nakuru District were in two phases; the first one which covered the
period 1992 to 1993, affected mainly the Molo and Olenguruone Divisions as they then
were; while the second phase covered the period 1997 to 1998 and affected mainly Njoro,
Mauche and Lare Divisions and to some extent Nakuru town. Under this subheading we
will only deal with the first phase, and deal with the second phase later under a different
subheading.
The first phase of the clashes in Nakuru started on the night of 14th March, 1992, in
Molo South. What triggered the violence there was as told by the Kalenjin witnesses
firstly, that Kalenjin children selling milk at Kamwaura Shopping Centre had been
chased away by some Kikuyu and that their parents in retaliation, had attacked the
Kikuyu businessmen at the trading centre.
Secondly, that because of the spill over of existing tension arising from the clashes in
Miteitei, Kipkelion and Londiani, the Kalenjin, thinking that the Kikuyu who were
holding a meeting in the neighbouring Kenya Ngairubi farm, were plotting to attack
them, took a preventive step and attacked the Kikuyu.
These, two reasons could not possibly be the causes for the clashes in Molo South and
we dismissed them. The clashes in Molo South started suddenly. According to
eyewitnesses, well organized and co-ordinated, and heavily armed Kalenjin raiders with
painted faces, were the ones that attacked the Kikuyu in Molo South. We shall deal with
the other reasons for this later.
Benjamin Ndega Nganga, the then Chief of Nyota Location, in Molo South, where the
clashes first broke out, told us that prior to the clashes, handwritten leaflets in red ink had
been seen in parts of his Location warning mainly the Kikuyu and the Kisii, to leave the
area or else they would be killed.
The leaflets were in the Kiswahili language and the authors described themselves as
Kalenjin Warriors. The leaflets were handed over to the police at Molo Police Station on
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or about February 1992, but apart from the barazas which Benjamin Nganga and the area
District Officer, Henry Obino, held to warn those distributing the leaflets of dire
consequences if they did not stop doing so, nothing else was done to avert the threatened
violence against the non-Kalenjin.
As it happened about the same time that these leaflets appeared, many of the Kalenjin
started moving their livestock and personal effects away into Ndoinet forest, which
abutted Nyota Location.
The clashes in the area started on the night of 14th March, 1992. Benjamin Nganga
told us that on 14th March, 1992, he saw many strangers at the Kamwaura Shopping ,
which worried him. Coincidentally he met his Assistant Chief, one Wilson Maritim, and
on inquiring from him why there were many strange faces at the Trading Centre the latter
answered that because it was a market day they had probably come there to buy livestock.
Benjamin Nganga was not too happy with this answer because although it was a
market day, it was not one of those market days when livestock was brought to the
market for sale. Benjamin Nganga coincidentally also met later that day five Anti Stock
Theft Unit police officers at the Trading Centre and was told by one of them, a Kisii, that
he had seen a suspiciously large number of people in the nearby Ndoinet forest, a fact
which heightened his fears of impending trouble.
In Sondu too, strange people were seen in the area before clashes broke out there.
However, on the same day at about 10 pm. Kenya Nguirubi farm was attacked by an
armed gang who were suspected to be Kalenjin, who violently attacked several of the
Kikuyu there; a few were killed, a few escaped with cut and arrow wounds, many of their
houses were burnt and a number of their livestock were stolen. Among those who died on
that night was the brother of David Tom Maari, an advocate of the High Court of Kenya.
He told us that he and some policemen in uniform, met the raiders face to face, near
his father's farm in the Kamwaura area, armed with bows and arrows clad in red "shukas"
and who threatened to kill him along with those he was with at first oblivious of the fact
that some of them were policemen. Their hostile attitude only softened when they
realized the presence of the policemen with David Maari.
The raiders' explanation for the violence was that because the Kikuyu had shown they
would not vote for "Mzee" in the general election which was due later that year they had
decided to kill them along with any other person who like them would be unwilling to
vote for him; that they were paid five hundred shillings for every male adult non-Kalenjin
killed and two hundred shillings for every non-Kalenjin male child killed, and that they,
had received their training in some forest in Bomet District.
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On the 15th March, 1992, the raids spread to neighbouring farms where similar
destruction was caused. The raiders made surprise attacks both at night and during
daytime and set ablaze several grass thatched non-Kalenjin houses, stole livestock, looted
houses and killed or seriously injured any non-Kalenjin they came across. Among the
locations into which the clashes spread were Kapsumbeiwo, Chemaner, Kipsonoi, Nyota
and Temoyetta, all in Molo South.
There were a few retaliatory attacks against the Kalenjin in which some of their
houses were also burnt and, in isolated cases, deaths occurred. Among those who were
victims of the retaliatory attacks was a prominent farmer and retired military officer,
Capt. Belsoi.
However, because the Kalenjin raiders appeared more prepared, organized and the
security agents seemingly supported them in view of the several instances. in which they
should have but did not arrest them, the Kalenjin raiders inflicted heavy casualties on the
non-Kalenjin and caused them
extensive loss of property.
The attacks on the non-Kalenjin caused fear, loss of life and property and a feeling of
helplessness and hopelessness on the survivors. Several of them fled their homes with
whatever little they were able to salvage and trekked towards Molo Town. This
encouraged the Kalenjin raiders to make more daring and blatant attacks sometimes
within the vicinity of the security forces. For instance, on 16th March, 1992, while the
District Commissioner, John Abduba, was holding a baraza at Boroni Primary School
which incidentally was attended by only non-Kalenjin, the Kalenjin started torching
houses nearby.
They were coming in large numbers from Ndoinet forest and the presence of security
men did not deter them. The police managed to arrest a handful of them, but that did not
deter the others who continued looting and burning houses
belonging to the non-Kalenjin.
Although we were told that those arrested were later charged, no further evidence was
made available to us in that regard. What is, however, notable is that the Kalenjin raiders,
including those arrested then were in some sort of uniform and painted white faces
implying that they were a well organized and trained militia which was fully prepared to
attack the non-Kalenjin.
After 17th March 1992, the raids in the Molo South
region were sporadic. Most people had left their homes and looters and stock thieves had
a field day. Many livestock were stolen and corrugated iron sheets were removed from
the roofs of non Kalenjin houses and carried away. A few Kalenjin houses were also
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affected more particularly on settlement farms, which were occupied largely by nonKalenjin.
We were told that all the Kalenjin in such farms also fled and trekked towards and into
Ndoinet forest to join their brethren in Bomet and Kericho Districts , which were on the
opposite side of the forest.
After 17th March, 1992, there was a short lull, but the clashes resumed in the area and
also in the Mau Summit Location on 24th April, 1992; and on 25th April, 1992, in
the Olenguruone Division. Molo South is about 60 km from Olenguruone and about
30km from Mau Summit Location. That the clashes started in the three areas
simultaneously clearly shows that they were organized and controlled from a central
position.
Besides the reasons which were given for the renewed violence in Molo South,
differed from those given for the clashes in Mau Summit and Olenguruone. We were told
that on or about 20th April, 1992, four Kikuyu Administrative police officers, from
Chemaner, in Molo South, while in the company of another Kikuyu went to Kalenjin
homes in search of items which had been stolen in the course of the earlier clashes. The
Kalenjin who felt they were being harassed by the Kikuyu raised a war cry and then
several Kalenjin armed with bows and arrows attacked the Kikuyu.
In Mau Summit area of Molo Division, the clashes first started on Big 15 farm, which
was occupied wholly by the Kikuyu and, where several Kikuyu houses were burnt. The
fires spread to adjoining farms notably Sinendet A & B which were predominantly
occupied by the Kalenjin; Baraka farm, which together with African farm, Jogoo and
Kamara farms, among others , were occupied by a mixture of tribes but predominantly by
the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin.
The burning of houses on these and other farms, affected all communities but mainly
the non-Kalenjin who were forced to flee their farms to seek refuge at Mau Summit,
Total Shopping Centre and Molo Town. The majority of them have not to date returned
to their farms, which presently are used by the Kalenjin as grazing pastures and for their
own cultivation. We were told that some of the non Kalenjin have either sold or leased
their farms to the Kalenjin as they fear returning there because of insecurity.
The result is that farms which were previously occupied by a mixture of the Kalenjin
and the Kikuyu like Sinendet C, are presently only occupied by the Kalenjin. Multipartyism was given as the main reason for the clashes in Mau Summit area, but all the
witnesses who testified from the area did not elaborate.
The clashes in Olenguruone Division of Nakuru District were most tragic, well
planned and executed as all the Kikuyu and other non-Kalenjin tribes then resident in the
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area were driven out of their farms where they had lived peacefully with their Kalenjin
neighbours for many years. Olenguruone was previously a forest reserve which was
inhabited by the Dorobo (Ogiek). In 1939, however, the Europeans settled over four
thousand Kikuyu squatters there. The area was originally part of Maasailand, but because
of. frequent clashes between the Maasai and the Dorobo, the Maasai were pushed further
south to obviate further clashes. During the State of Emergency declared in 1952, most of
the Kikuyu who had been settled there were rounded up and repatriated to various places
in Central Province. In 1955, Olenguruone was declared a settlement area for the landless
squatters who comprised the
Kikuyu, the Kipsigis and the Kisii. They were given plots of land ranging from five to
twenty five acres. A few Dorobo also got land and settled alongside those other tribes.
However, there was no settlement scheme for the Dorobo. After independence other
tribes, for example the Kamba, the Nandi and. other Kalenjin tribes, although they were
few, were also given land in the area.
The clashes in Olenguruone Division started on 25th April, 1992, and pitted the
Kalenjin against mainly the Kikuyu, even though the other tribes were not spared. The
area Chief Jonathan Musee Mutai and an Acting Assistant Chief, Joseph Kirui, told us
that the death of one Kiplangat Arap Kipkilach, a Kalenjin who was allegedly beheaded
by the Kikuyu, sparked off the violence. Kiplangat Arap Kipkilach was allegedly
beheaded on 24th April, 1992 by allegedly known people all Kikuyu.
John Kimutai Arap Langat who claimed to be the son of the deceased told us that he
lived in the same homestead with the deceased, and that on 24th April, 1992, their home
was raided by people who he did not identify. He escaped into Segemia in Maasailand
where he remained until the next day when he was informed of his father's death.
He returned home immediately, and by the roadside near his home he saw a headless
body which he said he identified by the clothes and legs as that of his father. He did not
say whether there were any special features on the legs which made him particularly
identify the body as that of his father.
The police allegedly took the body away but no one knows where they took it to or
where it was eventually buried. Neither Jonathan Mutai nor the relatives of the said
Kiplangat Arap Kipkilach formally reported the beheading to the police. Indeed, no one
had gone to the police to claim his body.
John Kimutai Arap Langat was looked for when we
raised the issue whether indeed, Kiplangat Arap Kipkilach ever existed, and if so where
his body was buried. Neither John Kimutai Arap Langat nor any other person was able to
tell us what happened to the headless body alleged to be that of
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Kiplangat Arap Kipkilach.
We have a gut feeling and the circumstances seem to support the view that Kiplangat
Arap Kipkilach did not exist, or if he existed and later died, the death had nothing to do
with the clashes. The then area District Officer, Paul Cheruiyot, a Kalenjin. denied under
cross-examination that the death caused the clashes, but he was sure that it was the
culmination of events leading to the clashes in Olenguruone Division.
We are of the view that there was a wider scheme to which Paul Cheruiiyot and
Jonathan Mutai were party, to drive out the non-Kalenjin, and in particular the Kikuyu
from the area. Paul Cheruiyot denied having got any prior information about the clashes,
but admitted having been told by Njihia Mwaniki that the Kikuyu in Nyambogo and
Chepakundi were spending nights in the bush because they feared being attacked and
burnt in their houses by the Kalenjin, which report he said he dismissed-as being
baseless. When the clashes eventually broke out he condoningly instructed the security
men to shoot in the air whenever they saw the raiders and not at them.
Be that as it may, the death of Kiplangat Kipkilach was one of the reasons given by
the Kalenjin, which sparked off the clashes in Olenguruone Division. It was also alleged
that the Kikuyu had for several months preceding the clashes been holding night
meetings disguised as religious meetings to plan and prepare to attack the Kalenjin.
The meetings were held from home to home and in each of those meetings they would
beat drums, sing and dance to conceal the simultaneous digging of pits inside those
houses, into which they buried their personal effects in readiness for the attack which it
was claimed they eventually started.
Esther Martha Lavuta, a Kaniba, told us that after the Kikuyu had buried their
belongings they set their houses on fire to spark off the violence. This was clearly a
ridiculous suggestion and has only been stated to be rejected. The other reason given for
the clashes is a claim by the Kalenjin that on 24th April, 1992, cows belonging to one
Arap Kogogen, a Kalenjin, were slashed by people who were believed to be Kikuyu.
The incident, coupled with the other incidents we have stated, above, were according to
the Kalenjin, the immediate causes of the clashes in the area. However, the area District
Officer who was allegedly informed by the Chief about the maiming of the animals
denied any knowledge of that incident. In that regard his testimony is at variance with
that of the area Chief. We observe here that the slashing of animals was also given as a
reason for the clashes in 0l Moran.
The Kikuyu on their part stated that the clashes had been planned and executed by the
Kalenjin with a view to driving out of Olenguruone all the non-Kalenjin and more
particularly the Kikuyu so that they would thereafter occupy their land.
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Whatever the reason and motive for the clashes, the people who were driven away
were the non-Kalenjin. The Kalenjin who were heavily armed, with painted faces, and
wearing some sort of uniform raided non-Kalenjin houses, either killed or wounded any
non-Kalenjin they came across, looted and torched their houses, and stole their livestock.
They later demolished the non-Kalenjin houses and took away the building materials.
This also showed that they were the aggressors and that they did not want the nonKalenjin in the area. We were told that a group of over three thousand non Kalenjin being
led from Chepakundi to Olenguruone town by Pastor Daniel Serebebi Saramiah Kipsigei,
a Kalenjin, met a gang of about one hundred and sixty Kalenjin raiders in some sort of
uniform, who threatened to kill them, and could have done so had the Pastor not pleaded
with the Kalenjin raiders to leave the defenceless non-Kalenjin alone. As all this was
happening the security forces were nowhere to be found.
Their complacency was conspicuous, and when looked at objectively it bordered on
connivance. All non-Kalenjin were driven out of Olenguruone, and to date only a few,
non Kikuyu, have returned to their farms. We were also told that when Njuguna Maina, a
Kikuyu, attempted to go back to his farm, he was hacked to death.
The fact that many people have not returned to their farms for fear of insecurity seems
to suggest that, the Police Force and the Provincial Administration connived at the ethnic
violence in the area. The roles in the clashes particularly of Paul Cheruiyot and Jonathan
Mutai should be further investigated.
Clashes in Naivasha Division pitted the Maasai against the Kikuyu, but witnesses
could not give an exact date for this. What was clear is that the clashes may have been
sparked off by rampant stock thefts in the area with the Kikuyu and not the Maasai, as
victims. As a result of such thefts one Maasai who was suspected to be a stock thief was
killed.
Three people, all Kikuyu, who were suspected as the killers were arrested, arraigned
in court for murder, but were eventually acquitted. We were told that the acquittal did not
please the Maasai who in retaliation, attacked and killed three Kikuyu in broad daylight,
at Kigecha — Village, in Maai Mahiu Location; but the killers were not identified and no
arrests were therefore made.
Three or so days later, without any provocation whatsoever, the Maasai invaded
Kigecha village again while armed with sharp weapons, burnt several houses and grain
stores belonging to the Kikuyus and killed at least ten people and injured several others,
all Kikuyu, before they escaped. In this second raid other neighbouring villages were also
affected.
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The area Chief Lasiit Ole Kipelekenya, and Joseph Chege the Assistant Chief of Maai
Mahiu Sub-Location which was mainly affected by clashes, told us that the clashes came
as a surprise to them, but were decisively dealt with by the Police force. The Provincial
Administration officers on their part organised barazas to reconcile the warring parties
and since then there has not been any recurrence of the clashes.
It is noteworthy that although the area was inhabited by other communities like the
Kisii and the Luo, they were not affected by the incidents of arson, murder and thefts.
Only the Kikuyu were affected and we think that there must have been a political motive
for this. The District Criminal Investigations Officer at the time, Dida Golicha, told us
that the clashes in the Naivasha Division were a spill over from Enoosupukia, but we did
not receive any other evidence to corroborate it.
What we think was the underlying cause was the general Kalenjin and Maasai hatred
for the Kikuyu on political grounds, and the clashes were meant to distabilise them as
they were quite many clustered in an area which was believed to be a Kanu zone. The
Kikuyu at the time made no secret about their opposition to Kanu, which was
predominantly supported by the Kalenjin and the Maasai in the Rift Valley Province. The
clashes may well have occurred just before the 1992 general elections, otherwise, no
other plausible explanation was given for the clashes nor can we discern any.
With regard to the causes of the clashes in Nakuru District we earlier set out in general
terms what we were told were the causes and motives for the clashes. The evidence
before us looked at as a whole discounts those as the possible reasons for the clashes. All
the areas apart from Naivasha, within the District that we have considered, fell within
Molo Constituency which at the time had as its member of parliament, Njenga Mungai, a
Kikuyu.
But with the introduction of multi-party in 1992, political parties were based on ethnic
loyalties. Enough has been said- about this and the strained intertribal relations that it
caused. We will now only refer to the following evidence of some of the people from
Nakuru District namely, Peter Asiago, a Kalenjin primary school teacher, Augustine
Kipkemoi Ngerich, another Kalenjin from Baraka farm in Mau Summit, and David
Masubuch Malel, Chief of Chemanel Location, and contained respectively in the
verbatim reports of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 16th November, 1998,
20th November, 1998, and 2nd December, 1998:
"Mr. Asiago: My Lords the kind of discussion was that, 'You Kisii are "kamama" so
you have to support Us'...
Chairman: The Kalenjin teachers told the Kisii teachers that they expected your support?
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Mr Asiago: Yes, My Lords. The Kalenjin said 'If you do not support us, you will have to
move.".
"Sometimes, we used to hear that Moi would not win and I think such utterances from
politicians could create hatred amongst the communities
Kiplenge: And that more specifically they were not happy about these people who came
from other tribes and who might have sympathized with the new leaders of opposition
who wanted to take the Presidency?
Mr. Ngerich: Yes, my Lords.".
"Mr. Chainnan: Kalenjin- did not want Kikuyus to join FORD.
Justice Bosire: What did they fear that such membership would
do?
Mr. Malel: My Lords I think they thought that FORD as a party was going to take over
the government
Mr. Malel: — Yes, they thought that Kikuyus were going to take over the leadership
Mr. Malel: I have said that the Kalenjin did not want the Kikuyus to join or support Ford
They, were happy with the party
Mr. Chairman: They were happy that there was multi-partyism to enable them support
Ford a rival political party?
Mr. Malel: Yes, My Lords.".
The attern the clashes took clearly showed that those who either supported or were
sympathetic to the emergent multi-party politics were the ones targeted. Except where we
had retaliatory attacks no Kalenjin or Kalenjin houses were affected by the clashes.
The Kikuyu and the Luo who were in the forefront in the support of plural politics
suffered the most. The other tribes who expressed some limited support of the same, like
the Luhya and the Kisii were also affected. The planners and perpetrators of the clashes
in. Nakuru, more particularly during the 1991 to 1993 clashes cannot have come from the
area.
John Rono Bor, Chief of Mau Summit Location, as appears in the verbatim report of
the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 4th December, 1998, was emphatic on
this. He said:
"... I have in mind that the reports that we were hearing about clashes in other places;
the Kikuyu community clashing with Kalenjin, reports about casualties arriving in Molo
hospital, people with arrows in their heads, corpses with missing parts of the body like
private parts, headless corpses and so on, must have developed hatred among the two
communities..... So, I believe some people somewhere must have made an arrangement to
come and avenge on us. But I wish to exonerate my people; they did not know, even
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Kikuyus when the torching took plate, ... And even most of them had gone to their farms.
On the following day on 25th, there was a mass exodus. That means that these people did
not know the cause of the clashes.".
He was also emphatic that the motive for the clashes, was political. He made us to
understand that the Kikuyu were excited about multi-partyism and the Kalenjin thought
that they were humiliated by the utterances of the Kikuyu. The clashes in Nakuru District
have also to be looked at against the political- climate of the time. Before the clashes
erupted in the district there had been clashes in Tinderet in Nandi District, and in
Kipkelion, Chirchila, Londiani, and Sondu in Kericho District.
All these clashes were preceded by political rallies at Kapsabet, Kapkatet and Narok
in which prominent Kalenjin leaders preached one message, namely, that all the nonKalenj in who did not support Kanu must leave the Rift Valley Province "or else", they
would be driven out by force.
The politicians included senior cabinet ministers in the government of Kenya
including the then Vice-President of the Republic of Kenya George Saitoti. We have no
record to show that any action was taken against them for their unsavoury and
inflamatory statements which, in our view were prima facie, criminal as they were meant
to incite the public to violence.
Nor do we have any evidence that any of the politicians protested what was attributed
to them in the print media. As we stated elsewhere in this Report many communities in
Kenya, and more particularly the Kalenjin, follow what their leaders advise.
Consequently, considering the timing of the clashes, those leaders became the prime
suspects as the perpetrators and planners of the clashes. Otherwise, they owe this country
an explanation as to why, as is expected of the Government, its leaders and servants, they
did not respect the law.
Besides it is too much of a coincidence that the clashes appeared systematic, the
raiders were dressed and armed themselves in a similar manner in all the affected areas,
and that the same community, the Kalenjin, were the aggressor in all cases, targeting the
other ethnic communities which did not agree with them politically. Moreover, the
clashes immediately preceded the general elections of 1992, and we believe that they
were intended to drive away communities who were likely to vote against the party in
power Kanu, which the majority of the Kalenjin supported.
This political objective was used to stir up and to spur on the traditional Kalenjin
antipathy against the Kikuyu and their age long desire to regain the lands which they say
they lost during European settlement in Kenya.
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The 1992 and 1993 clashes in Nakuru affected mainly Molo and Olenuruone
Divisions, which have since been sub-divided into several other Divisions. For instance
Molo, as it then was, now has Kamara, Kuresoi, Keringet and Molo as divisions. By 1992
there were three District Officers in Molo Sub-Division two of whom were based at Molo
and one at Olenguruone.
When the clashes first broke out the two District Officers who were based in Molo,
Henry Obino and one Wanjohi, acted swiftly, and we think, decisively, as they with the
then Officer Commanding the Molo Police Station, Joseph Saoke, mobilised the security
men under their command, moved to the scene of the clashes and arrested over one
hundred and forty suspects for various offences including
murderer and arson.
Their action stopped the clashes in the Kamwaura area within two to three days and as
we have come to expect, the three officers were transferred immediately thereafter. Henry
Obino was transferred even before he completed his report on the clashes.
We have a feeling that whoever effected the transfers must have wanted those officers
out of the way so that realisation of the purpose of the clashes should no longer be
obstructed or hindered.
Besides, we heard evidence of events prior to the clashes. There were leaflets
circulating in Molo South warning the non-Kalenjin to move out of the Rift Valley or
else they would face dire consequences. There was talk among school children of plans to
evict the non-Kalenjin, which initially were not taken seriously.
Cosmas Onderi Petro, a resident of Cheptagurn farm in Molo South, told us that the
impending clashes were common talk in his area and also that one Ntimamu, a Kalenjin,
who worked for Jonathan Ngeno, then a Cabinet Minister, had told him that there would
be war to drive out the Kikuyu from the area. Thereafter, there was a general exodus of
the Kalenjin into Ndoinet forest with their livestock and personal effects. The District
Officer of Olenguruone Division, Paul Cheruiyot, was told, at least two weeks before
clashes broke out there, that the Kalenjin had vowed that they would burn all the Kikuyu
houses with a view to driving them out of the Division, but he did nothing about it.
Besides on or about 21st April, 1992, some Kikuyu families had reported to him that
they had heard rumours of impending attacks on the Kikuyu in the area, but he dismissed
their information as baseless notwithstanding the information he already had concerning
the fact that the Kalenjin had threatened to do so. Neither the Chiefs, nor their Assistants
passed these pieces of information to those in authority, and where that was done, no
action was taken to pre-empty the clashes.
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So in Nakuru District, the events preceding the clashes reveal a general reluctance on
the Provincial Administration officers, who knew well that clashes would occur, to take
any pre emptive action. For instance, Assistant Chief Wilson Maritim, disappeared as
soon as the clashes broke out within his Sub-Location in Molo South and was nowhere to
be seen until after the clashes had been stopped .
He did not even attend two barazas, one which was chaired by the District
Commissioner and the other by the Provincial Commissioner, both which were held in
his Sub-Location. As it later turned out, he had prior knowledge of the impending
clashes and had contact with the raiders, but he withheld that information from those who
needed to know it and who would have taken preventive action. He was later retired from
the public service because of his involvement in the clashes but we think that mere
retirement was not sufficient punishment.
A common feature in all the clash areas which we have already described was the late
arrival of the Police Force and the Provincial Administration officers at the scenes of the
clashes and their deliberate reluctance to shoot to disable and to arrest those caught red
handed in taking part in the clashes.
That behaviour coupled with what we have stated clearly suggest that those who were
supposed to prevent or stop the clashes had prior knowledge they would occur, but did
not want to stop them or were under orders not to do so. The raiders must also have either
had prior reassurance in this regard or having observed that the police by firing into the
air, did not intend to kill or arrest any of them carried on their attacks undeterred.
It was no wonder therefore, that in Molo South while the District Commissioner was
holding a baraza at Boroni Primary School, the arsonists were busy torching houses
within the vicinity of the venue of that baraza.
Another common feature in the clash torn areas, Nakuru District included, was the fact
that the clash victims were driven out of their homes and farms into camps in towns and
trading centres where they lived in make shift structures and in unsanitary conditions,
with their children unable to go to school and with little or no food and medicines.
Yet, apart from the assistance which NGOs and churches provided, the Police Force
and the Provincial Administration officers did not take any or sufficient steps to ensure
that the victims were provided with basic needs. Instead, what we were told they did was
to order the victims to return to their farms notwithstanding that the security situation was
volatile.
The victims' houses having been burnt it was mischievous and insincere for the Police
Officers and the Provincial Administration officers to require them to return to their
farms. For instance in Olenguruone, the then Provincial Commissioner, Mohamed Yusuf
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Haji, and the late Mr Ishmael Chelanga who was then District Commissioner of Nakuru
District, told thousands of victims at Olenguruone on 28th April, 1992, to return to their
farms on the ground that security had been improved. This was after the two
administrators had flown over the area and seen that most of the houses had been burnt
down or were still smouldering.
It was illogical to expect the people to return to their farms when they did not have
shelters to live in and when the security situation was still volatile. That was conduct
which showed extreme callousness on the part of the security forces and the Provincial
Administration for the plight of the victims, and possible connivance of the clashes by
them.
Similarly in many if not all clash torn areas, the Police Officers and Provincial
Administrators heavily relied on and over emphasised the importance of "barazas". While
we concede that barazas are an important tool for the dissemination of information
particularly regarding government policies in times of peace, and also that barazas may
be used to promote reconciliation where the matter in dispute is simple and clear, we do
not think that having regard to the serious and ethnic nature of the clashes, the barazas
could, or indeed, achieved much during the clashes.
In some cases we think they were an excuse for not taking decisive action to stop the
clashes. The Government to the common man is represented by the Provincial
Administration, and the Police Force, and if those cannot offer them the protection they
need then the basis upon which their faith in the Government is anchored is completely
eroded.
That is what many of the clash victims who have yet to return to their farms told us,
and the blame lies squarely with the Provincial Administration and the Police Force who
seem to have abdicated their responsibility of giving equal protection to all people.
On 2nd September 1993, Molo, along with Burnt Forest and Londiani were declared
security operation zones under Section 85 of the Constitution and Part III of the Public
Security Act. This was at the time when there was a revival of clashes in those areas.
In Molo, renewed violence started with a spate of stock theft of non-Kalenjin,
livestock and also when a Mkorino from Kariba farm was killed when he tried to resist
the theft of his livestock. It was followed by leaflets advising the non-Kalenjin to leave
the Rift Valley Province.
Then there followed an attack on 25th July, 1993, of one Mongare at Bachuke farm,
and on the same night a woman known as Teresa Moraa from Kongoi farm was attacked
and robbed in her house. Geoffrey Nganga and George Gachengo of Tebere and Wira
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respectively in Molo South were also attacked on 26th July, 1993, and their livestock
were stolen.
On 1st August, 1993, as the police were investigating these attacks, the families of
Sanden, Kiplangat Tuwei, and Daniel Chepkwony, all Kalenjin, were attacked, and one
of them, Kipyegon Sanden, was killed. Though the attackers were not identified they
were believed to be Kikuyu. The police then raided Morinduko farm, which was
occupied mainly by the Kikuyu, and recovered two home made guns, a thunder flash, a
quiver containing seven arrows, a hand axe, a Somali sword and three live bullets.
About the same period William Ole Ntimama the well known Maasai politician, is
reported in The Standard of 5th April, 1993, Exhibit 173, to have decried the manufacture
of firearms in Molo and Enoosupia. We think that this exposure must have been one of
the reasons why the Government took prompt action in quelling the clashes in the area
then.
We were also told that the attack on the three Kalenj in families and the recovery of
the weapons sparked off an attack on the Kikuyu and the Kisii at Arimi farm which is
occupied by mixed communities, and that Hillam Kamau, a Kikuyu aged seventy five
years, was shot with five arrows, which were later found stuck in his body. He later died
from the arrow wounds. His workman, Anthony Asiago, a Kisii aged twenty eight years,
was also killed.
The attackers went to the home of a Mrs Mukuni, a Kikuyu, raped her and escaped
with some of her properties. They also attacked the home of one Kabue set his house
ablaze, and injured his son Joel. The raiders then moved on to an adjoining farm,
Temoyetta 4 where they attacked and killed one Philip Kamau Njuguna and injured a
visitor who was in his house. The raiders were believed to be the Kalenjin. We were also
told of the killing of a Kalenjin boy at Kamwaura by people suspected to be Kikuyu.
In the course of the swift and decisive operation by the police, Ruth Chepkorir w/o
Langat, and a Kalenjin, was shot and killed at Temoyetta 4. This death and the other
incidents aroused a lot of interest and consternation. Some policemen who were
suspected to have shot her were immediately arrested and were soon thereafter arraigned
in court for murder. We were told that they were eventually acquitted of the charge for
lack of evidence, but the damage had already been done.
We have narrated the foregoing incidents which occurred in July and August, 1993, to
show that the police action then and the government reaction to the clashes was different.
They were swift and decisive. The Government soon thereafter declared the area a
security operation one, even though in comparison, the events of 1991 and 1992
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regarding the clashes, were of greater magnitude and caused greater suffering, loss of life,
damage and destruction of property.
The Government action in July to September 1993, including the declaration of Molo
as a Security Zone demonstrated a greater willingness than before to end the clashes.
The action and the security operation in Molo Division seemingly brought the clashes to
an end as since then no clashes of the same magnitude have been experienced there.
There were, however, isolated incidents of stock thefts and incidents of house breaking
and burglary, but which are not of major concern to the residents.
Of major concern, however, is the fact that neither the ordinary police operation nor
the security operation in Molo ha's facilitated the return of all clash victims to their farms.
Many, particularly in Mau Summit and Keringet area are yet to return to
their farms.
The case of Olenguruone remains a scar in the Government image. We were told that
some displaced people from Olenguruone had been given alternative land in Elburgon
area, but the beneficiaries clearly seemed uncertain and doubted the
sincerity of the government for the gesture which they believe is merely an exercise
intended to placate them and later drive them out.
The clashes in Nakuru District, apart from taking lives, causing destruction and loss of
property, and displacing a large number of people, engendered hatred among
communities particularly the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu to the extent that at the height of
the clashes no Kalenjin could travel through towns like Elburgon or Molo; and no Kikuyu
could move freely in any area predominantly occupied by the Kalenjin. They would be
instantly killed.
A farm manager of Benjamin Kipkulei, a former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Education was stoned as he drove his Toyota pick-up through Molo town and was
eventually burnt inside it merely because he was a Kalenjin, We were told that those
responsible were the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Luhya, the Luo and the Kambas who were
then resident in the town. Mutual suspicion more particularly between the Kalenjin and
the Kikuyu which for sometime had thawed to some degree was heightened. Government
officers in those areas also tended to be partisan in favour of their ethnic communities.
The late Ishmael Chelanga, the District Commissioner of Nakuru District at the time,
and in abuse of his office, withdrew security men from Molo South on the pretext that
they had been away for too long from their families; but 'if that was the real reason, then
the logical thing that he should have done was to have sent replacements, which he did
not do. His action was questioned by Archbishop Ndingi Mwana Nzeki, who was then
the Catholic Bishop in charge of the area, but to no avail.
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Dida Golicha, the then Divisional Criminal Investigations Officer at Nakuru, testified
that a Kalenjin policeman at Tebere farm in Molo South, refused to take action against
known Kalenjin who had reportedly killed Daudi Osoro, a Kisii. The security men were
also used to further sectoral interests. The Archbishop testified, as in the verbatim report
of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 23rd July, 1998 as follows:
"Archbishop Ndingi: Some of my team went to Molo Police Station. While at Molo
Police Station, the PC and DC came there in a helicopter as though they were inspecting
what was happening. After that, we drove to Olenguruone Parish and stopped at the DO's
Office. There, we found some — whether they were soldiers or police I do not know —
but they were dressed in camouflaged uniforms. When we tried to take a picture of the
contents inside the car, they refused. We did see military helicopters flying over
Olenguruone and asked ourselves, "what are they looking for?"
Since people who had been driven from there were there, these helicopters never landed
to talk to us or anybody, what was their mission.".
It was not the Government's official or declared position that it was supporting the
clashes, or the eviction of certain communities. However, it was clearly evident that
certain Government officers, particularly those in the Provincial Administration either
acquiesced to or supported the clashes.
The clashes, therefore, divided the government servants in Nakuru District as it did the
people along tribal lines. Perhaps that will explain why police action was prompt and
decisive when a Kalenjin woman was killed because the Provincial Police Officer,
Francis Sang, a Kalenjn, personally went to the scene to oversee the investigation into
her death. The death of Capt. Belsoi also elicited a similar response.
We were also told that because of mutual Suspicion, farms with mixed communities
have experienced an unprecedented sale of land by the minority groups who move to
areas where their people are predominant. All the Kikuyu forced out of Olenguruone
cannot return there without risking their lives.
We were also told that most of them have sold their land cheaply to some Kalenjin in
so that they can settle elsewhere. We were told of similar sales in Molo South and Mau
Summit areas. That has in a way led to what Prof Ezra Kiprono Martim recommended
should have been done during the settlement exercise, namely, that ethnic communities
should have been settled together with a greater bias in favour of the indigenous people.
However, the result is being achieved through a process which may be termed as
ethnic cleansing, which seemingly had Government tacit approval as some Kikuyu and
Kisii victims of the clashes from parts of Chepakundi in Olenguruone Division; have now
landed at Elburgon area.
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Socially, many people have been forced into urban centres where they Iive in abject
poverty; there is an increase in lay-abouts in urban and shopping centres, and possibly an
increased crime rate.
Economically, many farms in Molo and Olenguruone Divisions, as they then were, are
lying idle and we think that overall food production must have been adversely affected.
These and the other factors, we have talked About are a potential source of future
conflict.
OL MORAN AND NJORO
Clashes in 0l Moran and Njoro Divisions like those in Enoosupukia area of Narok
District which we will deal with later, occurred after the general election unlike those in
other areas which preceded it. The two areas were part of the former European
settlements, and are presently administrative divisions, the former in Laikipia District and
the latter in Nakuru District.
After independence the Settlement fund Trustees took over farms in those areas and
later sold them to various land buying companies, among them Mutukanio Co. Ltd and
Laikipia West Co. Ltd, which companies together with several other sister companies
were associated with Dixon Kihika kimani, a cone time member of parliament for
Laikipia West within which Ol Moran falls, a and the current member of parliament for
the Molo constituency within which Njoro falls.
The shareholders in those several land buying companies, including the Kikuyu who
were the majority. Those shareholders form the majority of the residents of Ol Moran and
Njoro and also other Divisions in other areas where the companies bought land, which
include Nakuru North Constituency, which Kihika Kimani one time represented in
parliament.
In 0l Moran, apart from the Kikuyu, the Kisii, the Somali, the Luhya and a few other
people from smaller tribes, who all are agriculturists, we also have the Pokot, the
Samburu and the Turkana, all who are pastoral tribes, resident in the area. These pastoral
tribes are the indigenous peoples of the area who were driven out by the colonialists to
create room for European settlements.
The sale of former European farms to other tribes has over the years been a source of
disquietude among the pastoralists who feel that they were improperly deprived of their
ancestral land and that the presence of these other tribes constitutes an interference with
their grazing rights in the area.
We were told that whenever they felt like these pastoral tribes would graze their
livestock on the farms of the agriculturists and sometimes even on the crops growing
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there. This blatant illegal grazing had over the years been a source of conflict between
them and the agriculturalist tribes there.
Be that as it may, a few of them bought some shares from some shareholders of
Mutukanio Co. Ltd and Laikipia West Co. Ltd and settled there are the non pastoral
tribes. Otherwise the majority of the pastoral tribes live in their former reserves in
Manyattas. They migrate from time to time in search of pastures for their livestock which
are their lifeline.
Their attachment to livestock is cultural and sentimental with the result that any
interference with them evokes anger and consternation on their part.
The pastoral tribes sometimes referred to as Kamatusa (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana
and Samburu) are also traditional stock thieves. The Judicial Commission was told that
because of the high incidence of cattle rustling in the area, mainly against the agricultural
tribes, by January, 1998, when clashes broke out in of Moran, none of them kept any
cattle.
However, a few of them kept goats which they locked up indoors at night, a fact
which caused the pastoralists to resort to the use of firearms to rob the owners of their
goats. Indeed, clashes in the area were said to have been sparked off by such an incident
which we propose to deal with later. Previous complaints by the non-pastoral tribes in
that regard had not elicited any assistance from the Provincial Administration and Police
Force.
We were told that out of desperation and frustration the non-pastoral tribes, in 1996,
held a protest march in the area while carrying the body of a victim killed by the
pastoralists in the course of cattle rustling, to express their anger and frustration at the
government's seemingly lack of concern for their security and welfare.
The action spurred the Government to send a contingent of armed security men into
the area to evict the pastoralists who then and from time to time used to invade the nonpastorists land in search of grass, but for some reason the eviction did not materialize,
with the result that the problem persisted until the clashes under consideration broke out.
0l Moran, before January, 1998, was a location within Ngarua Division, and was made
into a Division on or about 22nd January, 1998, when the then Provincial
Commissioner, Nicholas Mberia, visited the area at the height of the clashes. The
making of Moran into an administrative Division was one of the measures he instituted to
contain the clashes and armed conflict In the area generally.
Previously, it was being administered from Ngarua (Kinamba) where the District
Officer was based. We heard evidence that the area had a police post and in Anti Stock
Theft Unit (ASTU) Camp at 0l Moran as the only Security centres, with only a handful of
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police who lacked essential facilities like transport and communications equipment.
When Ol Moran was made a Division, the police post at 01 Moran Trading Centre was
also elevated into a police station.
That a Location was elevated into an administrative Division clearly indicated how
expansive the area was, which the Ngarua District Officer administered. This when
considered with the available scarce security centres and their lack of transport and
communications equipment, lends some justification to the complaints by the nonpastoral tribes about lack of security.
We were also told that the area has a difficult terrain, poor infrastructure, and
whenever it rained people could only move from one place to another on foot. These
were given as constraining factors to effective administration and security surveillance,
but as we shall observe later in detail the greater problem was laxity and complacency by
provincial administrators and the security personnel.
Politically, 01 Moran falls within Laikipia West Constituency, which until 1992, had
G.G. Karriuki, a Kikuyu, as its Kanu member of Parliament, but he lost the seat in the
1992 general elections to Dixon Kihika Kimani, also a Kikuyu, who vied for the seat on a
DP ticket.
The latter did not, however, defend that parliamentary seat in the 1997 general
elections, but opted to contest the parliamentary seat for Molo constituency which he
easily won on a DP ticket. Chege Mbitiru, also a Kikuyu the Laikipia West Parliamentary
seat in 1997, on a DP ticket against a Samburu Kanu candidate, Laikipia West, like
Laikipia East, has a strong DP following and this has been one of the causes of
disharmony between the pastoral tribes, who are predominantly Kanu supporters, and the
non-pastoral tribes, who are predominantly or perceived to be opposition supporters.
Clashes in 0l Moran location started on the night of 11th January, 1998, when a gang
suspected to be of the Pokot, armed with among other weapons, firearms, raided the
home of Esther Njeri, a Kikuyu widow, and stole fourteen of her goats. She raised an
alarm which drew the attention of her predominantly Kikuyu neighbours who pursued the
thieves and managed to recover ten of the goats.
On the same night, the home of one Lechau Apalungeiya, a Pokot, who lived in the
same area, was raided by a gang of people believed to be Kikuyu, who cut and killed
about forty of his goats, maimed or killed some of his cattle and allegedly burnt four of
his houses there. It is not clear whether those who raided his home were the same people
who recovered Esther Njeri's goats, or whether it was another gang.
It is also not clear whether any of his houses were burnt because, although Lechau
Apalungeiya and other witnesses testified to that effect, the then Ag District
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Commissioner of Laikipiia, Lorna Odero, who visited the home two or so days later,
denied she saw any burnt houses there.
However, we were told that the killing and maiming of Lechau Apalungeiya's
livestock greatly incensed the Pokot who, in a meeting which the area District Officer,
Jonathan Soi held on 13th January, 1998, insisted that the Kikuyu compensate Lechau
Apalungeiva with an equal number of livestock as those killed or maimed before they
could discuss peace and reconciliation.
A committee of twenty elders was chosen from both sides to discuss peace, but the
Pokot adamantly refused to co-operate before their demands were met.
On the night of 14th January, 1998, the Pokot together with the Samburu raided
several Kikuyu homes in the Magadi area, killed two people and looted and burnt several
houses. The incident caused fear and panic among the Kikuyu and other non-pastoral
tribes who then fled their homes and sought refuge in 01 Moran Catholic Church and
other churches in 01 Moran, Sipili and Kinamba. The arson and murder continued on
15th and 16th January, 1998.
Neither Jonathan Soi nor the Officer Commanding, Ngarua Police Station, the late
Chief Inspector Jeremiah Ndahi, made any arrangements for the security of the refugees
or for the provision of food and other essential requirements for them. At some stage the
Catholic Church moved some of them to places which were considered safer because of a
threatened attack on them by the pastoral tribes.
We were told that the Kikuyu in Sipili, and other neighbouring areas, who felt that the
Government was in a way condoning the attacks, mobilized and armed several Kikuyu
youths, numbering about three hundred, with pangas and sticks among other weapons,
who were transported in commandeered matatus to Magadi in 01 Moran to avenge the
killing of the Kikuyu there and the destruction of their property.
We were also told that several Kikuyu women were mobilized and sent to a training
Centre known as Survey were they made meals for the Kikuyu youths. Because the rain
had made the road into Magadi area impassible the Kikuyu youths would get off the
matatus at Survey and proceeded on foot to Ngosusu area in Magadi. What happened
when they reached Ngosusu is a matter of inference.
Over forty one bodies, two of which were identified as being that of a Pokot and of a
Turkana, were later recovered and were positively identified as those of the Kikuyu youth
largely from Sipill, It would seem that the Kikuyu youths were confronted by well armed
Pokot and Samburu warriors who butchered them and rendered their revenge mission a
disastrous one.

64

The clashes in 01 Moran effectively ended on 18th January, 1998, as thereafter, no
incidents of tribal clashes were reported.
The Judicial Commission was told that the theft of Esther Njeri's goats and the
subsequent killing of Lechau Apalungeiya's livestock was reported at 01 Moran Police
Post, and later to Jeremiah Ndahi and Jonathan Soi.
They in turn, notified their respective superiors, the Officer Commanding the Police
Division, Mutinda Ngunguni and Loma Odero, as indeed, they were supposed to do.
Jonathan Soi, gave a detailed account of what he and the Officer Commanding Ngarua
Police Station, since deceased, did to contain the violence, but in our view what they did
fell far short of expectation.
He said that he was first informed of the events of 11th and 12th January 1998, on the
morning of 13th January, 1998, after which he immediately proceeded to the scene which
was at a place called Mirigwit.
He visited the home of Lechau Apalungeiya, saw his killed and maimed livestock,
talked to him and several Pokot people he found there, promised to take appropriate
action against the culprits and Jo consider the possibility of paying compensation to
Lechau Apalungeiya, without saying who would pay the compensation.
He promised to return the next day, which he did with a District Officer 11 Special
Duties, Kobia, who had been sent by Lorna Odero, to find out what exactly had
happened. The two preached peace and reconciliation which as we stated earlier, was
rejected by the Pokot unless appropriate compensation was paid.
The both Jonathan Soi and Kobia did not sense any impending trouble from the
negative stance by the Pokot and so did not take the necessary steps to avert it. They
simply drove away to Kinamba, leaving the Pokot disgusted and in a fit of rage. It was
not surprising therefore, that on the following night the Pokot and their Samburu allies,
attacked the Kikuyu in Magadi sub-Location, killed two of them and burnt more than
twenty five Kikuyu houses.
When later the next morning Jonathan Soi was informed about. This, he did not make
any plans to avert or contain further violence. We were told that the Pokot and Samburu
lived in Manyattas or clustered homesteads, which, for any person determined to contain
their activities, would have been easy to monitor.
Yet neither Jonathan Soi nor Jeremiah Ndahi, considered it appropriate to specifically
deploy the few security men they had to monitor the movement of the Pokot and the
Samburu.
Besides on 16th January, 1998, the Jonathan Soi was informed by the Assistant Chief
of Sipili sub-location, John Kipkoech Kimaiyo, that the Kikuyu there had mobilized
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several youths to go to 01 Moran to avenge the killing of their people there. Instead of
taking immediate steps to stop the planned attack, Jonathan Soi did nothing even in the
face of abundant evidence that such attack had been planned.
We were told that on the morning of 17th January, 1998, he saw and talked to several
Kikuyu women at survey who were cooking a large amount of food, which in view of the
prevailing situation there should have warned him that something bad was in the offing.
In the Police Report of an Inquiry Into The Circumstances Which Led To Clashes in
01 Moran, Exhibit 12, which was prepared by a team headed by Issac Maitiri Muthuri,
Deputy Commissioner of Police, it is states that Jonathan Soi Jeremiah Ndabi had met
groups of Kikuyu youths, armed with stones, rungus, pangas, bows and arrows and
spears marching towards Ngosusu, but they did not stop them.
Jonathan Soi in his evidence denied having seen the armed groups of Kikuyu youths,
but we did not expect him to admit it in view of what eventually happened to them.
Besides, the behaviour of Jonathan Soi, and the Jeremiah Ndahi, on the evening of 17th
January 1998, as testified to by Father Borsa Sandro of the Catholic Church, when he
visited them at Kinamba, leaves no doubt in anybody's mind about the blatant
indifference and complacency of the two officers to the clashes in 0l Moran.
Father Borsa Sandro testified that on the instructions of Bishop Kirima, he visited the
two officers at Kinamba to inquire about the plans they had to contain the violence in 0l
Moran. Despite the fact that reports from the area indicated that there was widespread
arson and other incidents of violence, both of them independently told him not to worry,
because, according to them, the situation was under control.
That behaviour was not isolated as evidence of similar behaviour by other Provincial
Administration officers and the security forces in other clash hit areas was adduced in this
Inquiry.
The behaviour the next day of both officers was hostile to the Catholic priest as among
other things, they refused to discuss with him ways to contain the violence in the area, a
fact which the Jonathan Soi admitted before us but argued that he did so because he first
wanted to see a copy of some memorandum from the Catholic Church which the priest
said he had come with before he could agree to talk to him.
This behaviour and his subsequent behaviour, was one of indifference and callousness
and connivance. In our view Jonathan Soi and Jeremiah Ndahi deserved at least, a severer
disciplinary action possibly dismissal, than a mere stern warning which the Muthuri
Committee had recommended in Exhibit 12, if not criminal prosecution.
The Officer Commanding Police Division, Mutinda Ngunguni, did not fare any better.
He was the senior-most police officer in the District and yet he did not take any notable
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action to stop the clashes or apprehend the raiders. He neither effected any arrest nor
assisted in the arrest of any raiders or arsonists.
One would have expected that as the most senior police officer in the District, lie
would take charge of and lead the security operations but he didn't. His behaviour, like
that of Jonathan Soi and Jeremiah Ndahi bordered on that of an aider and abetter of the
clashes.
The recommendation in the report of the Muthuri Committee, Exhibit 12, that he
should be served with a stern warning, is ridiculous. In our view severe action against
him, possibly a dismissal is called for, if not criminal prosecution.
Lorna Odero, told us that on at least three occasions between 14th and 18th January,
1998, she petitioned the Provincial Commissioner of the Rift Valley Province who was at
the time, none other than the notorious Nicholas Mberia, for security reinforcements, but
none was sent until 19th January, 1998, after the Pokot and the Samburu, had on their
own accord stopped their onslaught on the non- pastoralists.
Of course, Nicholas Mberia, did not bother to visit the area until 22 d January, 1998,
when he held a baraza at 01 Moran, and belatedly instituted measures to end the violence,
which measures, in our view, he should have taken immediately lie was notified about the
existence of clashes in the area.
The measures included the establishment of several police posts, the elevation of 0l
Moran Police Post into a police station, the elevation of 01 Moran Location into a
Division and the posting of another District Officer to the area, and most important of all,
but far too late, the deployment of a contingent of GSU men there.
The measures were laudable in as far as any future incidents were concerned, but with
regard to the clashes at the time, they were only a public relations exercise having come
too late after over forty one lives had been lost, several houses had been burnt, loss of
valuable property had occurred and many people had been displaced and their normal
lives disrupted.
Nicholas Mberia, as the District Commissioner in Kericho in 1993, will be
remembered for intransigent, partisan and illegal role he played in his handling of the
Luo squatters at Buru farm in Thessalia. As we shall later show, he adopted a more or
less similar role and attitude in dealing with the Njoro clashes.
The behaviour of the Provincial Administration and the Police Force no doubt was
reminiscent of people who, directly or otherwise, condoned the clashes. It was therefore,
not surprising that Lorna Odero, was on 16th January, 1998, shouted down by the irate
displaced persons who were camped at the 0l Moran Catholic Church, when she tried to
tell them that steps were being taken by the Government to reinforce security; and
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likewise the Kikuyu in Sipili, on the same day, resorted to self-help measures of
recruiting their, youths to deal with their security problem.
We wish to observe here that the behaviour of the Kikuyu was evidence of frustration
and desperation. As we stated earlier, in 1996, several people in Ngarua, out of frustration
and desperation because of the rampant thefts of their livestock by heavily armed
pastoralists, while carrying the dead body of a Kikuyu who had been killed during such
theft, marched along public roads in the area to protest the Government's apparent
indifference to their plight.
In Njoro too, as we shall show later, the area member of parliament, Kihika Kimani,
publicly threatened to employ self-help methods to deal with insecurity in Njoro area
arguing that the Government had failed to protest him and his constituents.
The clashes in 01 Moran appear to have been pre-planned and did not take the
Provincial Administration officers, particularly the area Chief Benjamin Kabomet, and
Jonathan Soi, by surprise.
For instance, prior to the clashes of January, 1998, some unsigned letters were
addressed to a few Kikuyu farmers who owned land in the area or occupied some
leadership positions there, threatening them with death unless they migrated from the
area.
These letters were taken to the Jonathan Soi, who dismissed them as having been
written by the Kikuyu as a ploy to achieve selfish ends. A month or so later, clashes
broke out which led to loss of lives and destruction of property and the displacement of
many people, mostly the Kikuyu, some of whom have not to date, returned to their farms.
It is the same Jonathan Soi, who as stated earlier, was on 16th January, 1998, informed
by, John Kimaiyo, of a planned attack against the Pokot and the Samburu by Kikuyu
youths, but took no action on the report. In each case, Jonathan Soi was complacent
suggesting that he either did not care or knew in advance and approved what was in the
offing and what it was intended to achieve and therefore did not want to interfere.
His behaviour, when he was the District Officer in Enoosupia, which as we stated
earlier, we will deal with later, was similar and we cannot help wondering whether it was
not with his connivance, that the clashes in the two areas occurred.
Njoro is one of the current fifteen Divisions in Nakuru District, and lies to the
South and South West of Nakuru. Like 0l Moran, its residents are from different ethnic
backgrounds with the Kikuyu as the majority. The majority of the residents were
shareholders in Njoro Mutukanio Co Ltd, a land buying company which, in the 1960s and
1970s bought farms in the area through the efforts of Kihika Kimani, for their settlement.
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Kihika Kimani was one of its promoters as also its sister companies whose only aim
was to buy land in the Rift Valley Province for the settlement of landless Kenyans. The
shareholders were from different communities.
The area we are concerned with is not confined to the administrative division known
as Njoro, but includes Mauche and Mau Narok Divisions which in times past, were part
of Njoro Division before it was sub
divided to produce the two additional administrative Divisions. Njoro Mutukanio Co.
Ltd, bought well over 51,000 acres of land in Njoro area.
Each shareholder could buy as many shares in the company as he could afford at the
rate of one thousand and fifty seven shillings per share, which would entitle him to 21/2
acres per share. Kihika Kimani alone got at least 353 acres. The farms abutted Tinet and
Mau forests parts of which, in the early 1980s, were hived out to create settlements for
the several Dorobo families who before then, were living in two forests as well as
Ndoinet forest in Molo South. We were also told that in 1978 and 1979, some Kikuyu
and Kalenjin bought a farm in the area which they eventually sub-divided into several
holdings which they shared among themselves and settled on.
Njoro is rich agriculturally, and the various ethnic communities who settled there were
united by their common desire to earn a living through fanning, and for a long time lived
in peace and harmony, intermarried and engaged in several joint social and economic
activities.
However, as stated elsewhere in this Report, the Kikuyu were better off economically
having learnt earlier to obtain financial assistance from banks and other money lending
institutions to improve their economic welfare. Because of their superior economic
position they were able, in addition to farming, to establish businesses in the new
settlements which included, retail shops, bars and restaurants, milling facilities and motor
transport businesses.
The Kikuyu Were also more politically conscious than other communities in the area
with the result that over the years since independence they have dominated politics, not
only in Njoro but also in other parts of Nakuru District. For instance, in the current
parliament, of the six parliamentary constituencies in Nakuru District, three or four are
represented by Kikuyus, and the remaining two by the Kalenjin.
Political representation in the Rift Valley Province has over the years been a source of
conflict or disagreement between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjiin. The Kalenjin feel that the
Rift Valley Province being traditionally Kalenjin land, 'foreigners', Which 'include the
Kikuyu, should not represent them, and where they do, they should be supporters of the
party which the Kalenjen support.
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During the era of one party politics, Molo constituency was represented in Parliament
by John Njenga Mungai, a Kikuyu, Who, in the 1992 general elections, successfully
defended his seat on a Ford Asili ticket after decamping from KANU. He however, lost
miserably, to Kihika Kimani of DP, also a Kikuyu when in the 1997 general elections he
tried to recapture it on a KANU ticket.
In Kenya, political loyalty seems synonymous with tribal loyalty. So because KANU
was not the political party the Kikuyu generally preferred, and which also happened to be
the party predominantly supported by the Kalenjin, Njenga Mungai stood no chance, of
winning the elections in his constituency.
The tribal clashes in Njoro and Ol Moran, unlike those in most areas elsewhere
erupted immediately after the 1997 general elections. But they were allegedly triggered
off by a political brawl in a bar at Ndeffo on 9th December, 1997, shortly before the
general elections, which resulted in the death of a Kalenjin, David Kibyegon Bii.
The Kalenjin in the area who were made to believe that David Bii had been killed by
the Kikuyus armed themselves with traditional Weapons and invaded Ndeffo Trading
Centre where they killed one Robert Waweru Kinuthia, a Kikuyu and injured four others,
burnt seven shops, seven small eating places, three butcheries and two motor vehicles, all
belonging to the Kikuyu.
The police and the Provincial Administration officers acted swiftly and restored calm
in the area. Thereafter, although there was general tension arising from mutual suspicion
by the two affected tribes, there were no significant incidents of violence or arson for at
least a month.
The response of the Provincial Administration and the Police Force to the incident was
prompt and appropriate. The violence did not go beyond 9th December, 1997, and two
days later, namely on 11th December, 1997, the then Provincial Commissioner,
Mohamed Yusuf Haji, properly held a joint Provincial Security Committee and District
Security Committee meeting to discuss the incident and its implications. In the minutes of
that meeting, Exhibit 13(B), the following apt statement is recorded:
"The members recalled that the inter-tribal clashes of 1992 erupted in the same way.
1997 being the year for the General Elections it was felt that the problem has to be dealt
with decisively and immediately, otherwise some people might not accept the fact that
the whole problem started in a bar following heated arguments."
The above statement and the plan of action the meeting adopted which appear
hereunder, clearly show that the joint committees were conscious that the 1992, tribal
clashes were politically motivated and any slight excuse could be used to start fresh
clashes. The plan of action the adopted was as follows:
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(a)
"Security officers should move in quickly whenever an incident has taken place.
(b) A standby security team should be formed in all districts.
(c)
ASTU officers who have overstayed in various areas to be
transported.
(d)
Politicians and other people known to be trouble shooters
to be monitored very closely and appropriate action taken where applicable according
to the law.
(e)
Intensive patrols to be carried in areas vulnerable to bring problems, more so this
time when some politicians are likely to capitalize on some issues.
(f)
The DCs should call all aspiring politicians together for harmonization of
peaceful campaigns."
Although the plan of action was comprehensive and appropriate, little was done to
implement it, if at all. Anyway, the 1997 elections in Njoro were generally uneventful.
In the 1997 general elections in Njoro, there were
two Parliamentary candidates in Molo constituency, John Njenga Mungai, of KANU and
Kihika Kimani of DP. There were other candidates who fell by the wayside during party
primaries.
In his evidence to the Judicial Commission
which was supported by the evidence
of
other witnesses, Kinuthia Mbugua, the then area District Commissioner said that
during the election campaigns there was common talk among the Kikuyu that if DP won
in the elections the Kalenjin would not only be driven out of the Rift Province but those
of them in important positions would also be removed.
Similarly, he said, the Kalenjin said that if KANU won they would drive the
Kikuyu out of the Rift Valley Province.
Kinuthia Mbugua and those other witnesses
also talked about leaflets which
were distributed in Molo constituency allegedly
authored by Prof Wangare Mathai, entitled "House of Mumbi", calling upon all the
Kikuyu to inter alia, vote for Mwai Kibaki the DP presidential candidate, and that if DP
won the elections it would sack all the Kalenjin in key posts.
Other witnesses told us that DP supporters were so confident that Mwai Kibaki would
win the presidential elections that some of them became arrogant and sometimes abusive.
When the elections were finally held arap Moi won in the, presidential election, but
Njenga Mungai of KANU, was defeated by Kihika Kimani of DP in the parliamentary
elections. Those results created not only in Njoro but in other parts of the country.
Kinuthia Mbugua, testified that leaflets were thereafter distributed in Moto
constituency calling for the eviction of the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley Province. There
was also a report in the Sunday Nation of 18th January 1998, and in the Daily Nation of

71

the next day, and contained in Exhibits 36A to 36C, about an alleged declaration at Narok
by some KANU stalwarts that if Mwai Kibaki filed an election petition challenging the
election of Daniel arap Moi as its elected President, there would be trouble in Kenya.
Indeed, when the election petition was filed, there was trouble in Ol Moran and Njoro,
both which were and still are DP strongholds, or so we think. There were a few Kikuyu
KANU supporters who in their evidence before the Judicial Commission said that they
were threatened by their fellow Kikuyu who regarded them as traitors to their tribal
political cause, The foregoing was the political scenario before and after the 1997 general
elections.
The 1998 clashes in Njoro started on the night of 25th January, 1998, at Stoo Mbilii
when a gang of people who were believed to be Kalenjin, while armed with bows and
arrows attacked some Kikuyus in their homes, set their houses on fire and killed those of
them who were not able to flee on time.
The attacks quickly spread to Ndeffo and other neighbouring farms. On the next day,
the Kikuyu, particularly in Lare Division grouped and organized retaliatory attacks
against the Kalenjin and they too killed and injured several of them and burnt many of
their houses.
The communities in the affected areas fled their farms, the Kikuyus headed towards
Njoro and Nakuru towns, while the Kalenjin fled towards Tinet and Mau forests. These
movements are telling more particularly when looked at against the events immediately
preceding the eruption of the violence on 25th January, 1998.
Neither the Provincial Administration officers nor the Police Force, save the Special
Branch, said they had any prior knowledge of the impending clashes. In their respective
testimonies before the Judicial Commission they said that the clashes took them by
surprise.
Petkay Shen Miriti, a Deputy Commissioner of Police, who was then Special Branch
Provincial Security Intelligence Officer, told us, and which was supported by Kinuthia
Mbugua, and David Kipkorir Siele, the special Branch District Security Intelligence
Officer, that from early January, 1998, a large number of people all Kalenjin, had come
from Bomet, Kericho and Trans Mara Districts, and camped in Tinet forest which abuts
Njoro, allegedly in search of land. About the same time, the farm of Kihika Kimani, and
two neighbouring farms, were invaded by people who were said to be the Kalenjin and
who were armed with clubs, pangas and spears.
Kihika Kimani, who was away from the farm at the time did not become aware of the
invasion until about 22nd January, 1998, and when he addressed the press, and as
reported in that
Exhibit 35 as follows:
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"The invaders have definitely been sent by their leaders with the intention of creating
conflict to pave way for renewed ethnic clashes which some KANU politicians have been
plotting."
According to Patkay Miriti, the invasion of Kihika
Kimani's farm had been reported to him by David Siele, a Kalenjin, on 17th January,
1998. However, there is no mention of it in the minutes of the District Security
Committee meeting held on 23rd January, 1998 Exhibit 22, which David Siele attended ,
and notwithstanding the fact that the invasion was reported in the Daily Nation of that
day Exhibit 35. Instead what appears in the minutes, Exhibit 22, under the heading:
MINU.6/98 SECURITY SITUATION, is as follows:
"The situation in the District is still satisfactory save for certain after election effects
where certain political parties especially the DP which is behaving arrogantly.
This behaviour has created bad relationship and the DSC is monitoring and checking
on incidents likely to spark insecurity, An example of that situation is Nakuru town
where opposition is using the bus park levy as a reason of (sic) creating misunderstanding
at the Municipality. Since the members know the motives are different, we have taken the
following measures:
An operation has mounted and 127 touts/hawkers have been arrested and taken to
court.
The Town Engineer and the enforcement officer have been directed by the DSC to
continue eradicating hawking within the town centre and bus station.
The same officers have been instructed to do away with all unauthorized structures."
David Siele, withheld the vital security intelligence information regarding the invasion
of Kihika Kimani's farm, from his District Security Committee, which, in line with the
directive given to the District Security Committees by the Provincial Security Committee
as contained in the minutes of its meeting held on 26 August, 1997, Exhibit 32(B) should
have enabled his District Security Committee to put in place contingency plans "to
counter any threats to security through covert instigation."
In fact, even in an un-addressed and unsigned facsimile message he allegedly sent to
the Directorate of Security Intelligence on 24th January, 1,998, Exhibit 37, he gave the
false impression that the invasion had not occurred earlier than I 9th January 1998.
According to Kipkorir Siele the date of the invasion was given to him by Kihika Kimani
when they met on 24th January, 1998.
Kihika Kimani could not possibly have given him that date because in his statement,
Exhibit 13(H), to the Abongo Committee which the Commissioner of Police of the time
appointed to investigate the violence at Njoro, made on 8th February 1998, Kihika
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Kimani had stated that the invasion occurred on 13th January, 1998, which is in
consonance with the testimony of Petkay Miriti, who said that Kipkorir Siele had on 17th
January, 1998, passed on to him, the information about the invasion of Kihika Kimani's
farm. Kipkorir Siele was lying.
We must also recall here Kipkorir Siele's deliberate act of deception was also repeated
in his first statement of 12th February, 1998, to the police, and contained in Exhibit 13
(E), where he made no mention whatsoever, of Kihika Kimani's letter or his meeting with
him.
It was only three days, later, and after he had been pressed by police investigators, that
he disclosed this in his further statement of 15th February, 1998, which is also contained
in Exhibit 13(E).
We also received evidence that on 23rd January, 1998, David Siele received, through
his Deputy, Philemon Opiyo Owino, a letter from Kihika Kimani, Exhibit 13(A), which
is as follows:
Hon Dixon Kihika Kimani
Box 13455 Nakuru
Date 23rd/1/1998
The Special Branch Officer
Nakuru District
Through their Njoro office
I wish to start by greeting you very much and asking you kindly to meet me privately
here at Njoro or my home at Lanet.
I wish to let you know that the situation here is very tense and it is very explosive. We
Kikuyus here are on the side of DEFENSIVE side and Kalenjin and Maasai are on the
side of offensive side now.
Now I would like to meet you and show you the two SIDED PICTURE. I don't tell
lies no and I trust your office very much from 1960 to date.
Now by today I am at Njoro but by tomorrow I will be at Maumanet Laikipia. I will
believe (sic-brief) you exactly what we are planning to do (next time) because we were
taught a lesson by the 1991- 1993 Ethnic clashes.
Please please let us meet.
I beg to remain Sir with deep respect,
Yours
Sign.
D. K. Kimani."
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Kipkorir Siele testified and Kihika Kimani confirmed it, that the two met at noon on
24th January, 1998, a Saturday, and the latter explained the frustration and desperation of
the Kikuyu in Njoro, and that he had met forty or so Kikuyu elders from various farms in
Njoro who had agreed that in the event that the Government did not immediately offer
them security to avert an impending attack on them by the Kalenjin, they would recruit
and arm Kikuyu youth for purposes of self defence.
The facsimile Kipkorir Siele, said he sent Exhibit 37, was supposed to be a review of
their talk, but a closer examination of it clearly shows that Mr Siele presented the facts in
an untruthful, slanted and distorted manner: Instead of stating Kihika Kimani's concern
that law and order should be maintained to obviate inter-ethnic skirmishes, he painted the
picture, which was clearly wrong, that Kihika Kimani had organized the Kikuyu to
invade the Kalenjin and thus making him appear to be the aggressor and not the intended
victim.
Regarding the large number of people who came to Njoro about the time Kihika
Kimani's farm was raided they were roundly referred to as land speculators. But Kinuthia
Mbugua told the Judicial Commission that at the material time the Government was not
allocating any land in the area, and that the alleged land speculators had been brought
there by two persons namely John Koske alias Cheragei and another Siele not David
Siele.
Both the Provincial Administration and the Police Force were aware of their presence
in Njoro area, but no attempt was made to drive them away. They were camped in the
nearby Tinet forest and we reckon that they were also the ones Kihika Kimani was
talking about in Exhibit 35.
Their presence in Njoro was realized at the beginning of January, 1998, and it was
soon thereafter that Kihika Kimani's farm and two others, were raided. We think that their
presence in Tinet forest was not for the stated reason that they were land speculators.
In Molo South too, a large number of people were seen within Kamwaura area a day
or so before clashes erupted there in March 1992. The joint Provincial Security
Committee and District Security Committee meeting we referred to earlier did correctly
observe that there were signs which signalled impending clashes in the area and
consequently adopted the plan of action already set out above.
The so called land speculators were from one ethnic community, the Kalenjin.
Witnesses were specific that they were the Kalenjin from Bommet, Kericho, Narok and
Trans Mara Districts. If indeed, they were land speculators one would have expected that
people from other communities would also have been there. In his evidence to the
Judicial Commission, the Provincial Police Officer of the Rift Valley Province, Philip
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Cheruiyot, stated that in the 1992 and 1993 clashes, there was a group called Kalenjin
Warriors which was involved in the clashes in Molo South.
He was then the Officer Commanding, Nakuru Police Division under which both
Molo and Njoro Divisions then fell and was therefore in a position to know who were
involved in the clashes there at the time. During the 1998 clashes in Njoro, he was the
Provincial Police Officer of the Rift Valley Province, and must have been made aware of
the presence of the so called land speculators who, according to Petkay Miriti, the Kikuyu
believed were the Kalenjin warriors. Petkay Miriti conceded that their presence should
have created a security alert. He described the situation during the period immediately
preceding the clashes as explosive and could be security rated as "Ready Alert".
Evidence was also adduced to the effect that there was tension between the Kikuyu
and the Kalenjin which was caused firstly, by the incident of 9th December, 1997, at
Ndeffo, and, secondly, by the presence in the Tinet forest of many strangers who were
believed to be Kalenjin warriors.
As a result of the tension, the Kikuyu refused to do business with the Kalenjin which
so incensed the Kalenjin who depended largely on the Kikuyu shops, Posho mills and
public transport for their day to day operations, attacked the Kikuyu. We are not here
concerned with whether or not the decision by the Kikuyu not to do business with the
Kalenjin was proper, nor are we concerned with whether or not the reaction by the
Kalenjin was justified.
Both Petkay Miriti and Kipkorir Siele testified that, from security intelligence reports
that they received from their staff attached to the Njoro area, the security situation in the
area was explosive. In their evidence to the Judicial Commission each of them testified
that he passed the information to his respective Security Committee.
However, in Exhibit 22, the minutes of the Kipkorir Siele District Committee which
met on 23rd January, 1998, the SECURITY SITUATION is given as "still satisfactory",
we doubt whether indeed this was done. Besides, both Nicholas Mberia and Philip
Cheruiyot denied Petkay Miriti notified them of the explosive security situation in Njoro.
They both also denied having been notified of the existence and contents of Kihika
Kimani's letter of 23rd January, 1998, Exhibit 13(A) to David Siele.
Recounting what happened at his meeting with Kipkorir Siele on 24th January, 1998,
Kihika Kimani told us that he told Kipkorir Siele about the Kalenjin raiders that they
were threatening security in the area, and that although the invaders of his farm had been
driven away, the threat of clashes was still looming and unless something was done to
avert the expected violence, he was prepared to mobilize Kikuyu youths for self defence
purposes, and that he had asked forty Kikuyu elders to mobilise Kikuyu youths to defend
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them if the Kalenjin attacked the Kikuyu. In effect he rehashed what was contained in his
letter to Kipkorir Siele.
Kipkorir Siele, testified to the same effect and added that after their meeting he
notified Petkay Miriti, the members of the District Security Committee and Special
Branch Headquarters about what Kihika Kimani had told him without disclosing the
source, before he left for Keringet, in Molo South, to attend a family meeting.
Considering the fact that the members of both the Provincial Security Committee and the
District Security Committee denied receiving such information, and in view of Kipkorir
Siele's subsequent conduct, we do not believe that he actually shared the information with
those who were supposed to be made aware of it, more particularly Kinuthia Mbugua and
the Officer Commanding Police Division, Peter Kilonzo Kavila.
Kipkorir Siele testified that a Chief in Njoro called Rono, a Kalenjin, had told him
about the people who were camped in Tinet forest, but unlike other witnesses who said
that they were land speculators, Rono had described them as people who had come there
to avenge certain unnamed Kalenjin who, according to a rumour, had been killed at
Naishi in Lare Division.
So, long before Kipkorir Siele met Kihika Kimani, he was also aware of the presence
of strange people who were camped in Tinet forest and the reason for their being there.
When on 23rd January, 1998, he attended the District Security Committee meeting of that
day, he did not tell the meeting about the impending Kalenjin revenge mission, the
tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin or about Kihika Kimani's letter to him.
In his evidence he tried to shift the blame for failure to inform the District Security
Committee about the existence of tension between the tribes, unto Peter Kavila by saying
that though he had raised the issue at the meeting, Peter Kavila had said that it was not
the sort of matter that should be included in the minutes of the meeting.
Kinuthia Mbugua who chaired that meeting like Peter Kavila denied that Kipkorir
Siele mentioned the matter or anything related to the clashes at that meeting. Indeed, if
that had been so the minutes concerning the security situation, should not have stated that
the security situation was satisfactory.
We turn to the facsimiles Exhibit 37, which Kipkorir Siele sent to the Special Branch
Headquarters of the Directorate of Security Intelligence. The following are the relevant
parts of that facsimile:
"...DP member of parliament for Molo stated that the situation within Ndeffo farm,
Mau Narok and Njoro areas is tense with a possibility of tribal clashes erupting any time.
He claimed that there is a large influx of Kalenjin warriors into the forest areas within
Ndeffo, Sigotik, Mau Narok who are preparing to attack the Kikuyu. ...He also revealed
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that following a meeting which he held in his house at Njoro with about twenty Kikuyu
elders on Friday 23' January, 1998, they resolved as follows:- that
(a)
Every location to form Youth Home Guards consisting of 500 youths to protect
the villagers from possible attacks.
(b) That the youths' will be armed with bows, arrows, sticks, knives, spears and rungus.
(c)
Possibility to revive GEMA/KAMATUSA talks adding that the problem at hand
is a Kalenjin/Kikuyu problem which should be solved by the two communities.
The government should not come in.
COMMENT:
The DSC members who have been handling the illegal occupation of the farms issue have
been alerted over the sentiments expressed by KIHIKA KIMANI and a public baraza has
been organised for Monday 26th January, 1998 to educate the area residents on the need
to live in peace and maintenance of law and order."
Apart from distorting the content of the discussion he held with Kihika Kimani.
Kipkorir Siele trivialized or rather toned down the seriousness of the concern Kihika
Kimani had expressed. He did not state anything about the need to send security
personnel to the area to avert the looming violence.
In his comment, which in effect is his assessment of the situation he highlighted the
fact that a baraza had been organized to be held on a designated date, and therefore, there
was no urgent need to take any more security precautions.
As already referred to, David Siele left to go and attend to personal errands despite the
fact that he had been told by Kihika Kimani that the situation was tense and, Chief Rono
had told him that the people who were camped at Tinet forest had come to attack the
Kikuyu, Other police witnesses who included the former Director of CID, Noah Arap
Too and the former Commissioner of Police, Duncan Wachira, regarded Kipkorir Siele's
behaviour, to put it mildly as strange.
We too regard his behaviour as not only strange but also that of connivance at the
clashes, When the clashes eventually broke out on the night of 25th January, 1998, he
was not present to assist the other members of the District Security Committee to stop
them.
When he was asked about it, his response was as strange as his behaviour. He told us
that after he had notified the Directorate of Security Intelligence and the members of the
District Security Committee about what Kihika Kimani had told him, he did not have any
more responsibility in the matter.
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However, his superior officer in the Special Branch, Benson Okemwa, testified to the
contrary and on that he was supported by Stanley Mutungi, a retired Deputy
Commissioner of Police, who told us what we already knew, that Special Branch Officers
were until January, 1999, policemen who were subject to the provisions of the Police Act,
Cap 84 of the Laws of Kenya, and were therefore obliged to take part in such operations.
We were also told that on the morning of 26th January, 1998, Kipkorir Siele suddenly
resurfaced and joined the other members of the District Security Committee at Njoro
where they had gone to stop the violence. He found about seven armed suspects had been
arrested for torching Kikuyu houses and intervened on behalf of one of them and sought
his release on the ground that he knew him and that the suspect had only been found
advisina the Kalenjin youth to stop torching the Kikuyu houses.
Kipkorir Siele was not present at the time the suspects were arrested, unless of course
he was watching from a hideout in the bush. He would not therefore know the
circumstances under which the suspects were arrested. That behaviour shows that he
knew much more regarding the causes ofthe clashes than he was read to admit to us.
Petkay Miriti too, behaved in a strange manner. He testified that as the Provincial
Security Intelligence Officer, he had been informed by among other people, Kipkorir
Siele. about the supposed land speculators and the explosive security situation in Njoro.
Although he said that he shared all this information with fellow members, of the
Provincial Security Council, they all denied the same.
The only inferences that call be drawn from the circumstances are that either he did
not notify them as he said he did or that if he did, all the members knew not only that
clashes were in the offing but aIso, who were behind them but denied any prior
knowledge to protect those people.
All in all, we had the Feeling that the members of' the Provincial Security Committee
and the District Security Committee knew Much more than they were prepared to tell us.
On 9th December, 1997, violence erupted at Ndeffo which the joint Provincial
Security Committee and the District Security Committee and the District Security
Committe meeting held on 11th December, 1997, considered . It will be recalled from the
minutes of the joint meeting, Exhibit 13(B), already referred to, that the Joint meeting
considered the inter tribal violence that erupted at Ndeffo, as a pointer to possible clashes.
The Ndeffo incident was quickly followed by the arrival and camping in the Tinet
forest of the Kalenjin who told Chief Rono, that their mission was to fight the Kikuyu
and not to buy land, and which information he passed on to Kipkorir Siele. It will also be
recalled that the Kikuyu had refused to do business with the Kalenjin.
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Although in our view, the refusal to do business was given merely as a silly excuse for
the clashes, the fact that there was talk about it was clear evidence of brew ing trouble
which should have but did not put Security Committees to be on security alert. Nicholas
Mberia, the Provincial Commissioner told us that he had prior information of certain
utterances by Kihika Kimani, among them that the clashes in Laikipia would spread to
Njoro, and also that some Kalenjin were threatening to evict the Kikuyu from Njoro and
other areas; but he did nothing to avert any possible violence in the area.
According to Kinuthia Mbugua, he liad also told Nicholas Mberia, that Kihika Kimani
had said he would recruit some Kikuyu youths to fight in Laikipia in defence of the
Kikuyu.
As one witness put it, the writirig was on the wall for all the members of the
Provincial Security Committee and the District Security Committee to see, but their
seemingly wholesale indifference and complacency tell us that they knew clashes were
coming and who was behind them but they deliberately failed to take the necessary steps
to stop them. Each of them should be investigated further regarding their role in those
clashes.
0l Moran and Njoro were and are, DP strongholds. Kihika Kimani wields a lot of
influence in the two areas, largely because of his past role in assisting the majority of the
residents to get land there. He proudly told us that he was a popular leader and that
wherever he chose to stand for parliamentary elections, would win. In fact lie plans to
stand for elections in the next general elections in a different constituency.
The 1998 clashes appear to have targeted Kihika Kimani and his supporters because
they occurred in areas in which he had successfully stood for elections on a DP ticket. As
we have attempted to show, the clashes were masterminded by people outside the areas
where the clashes occurred whose organized armed groups would, with the help of local
accomplices, start the violence, and then escape from the area leaving the locals fighting
each other on the mistaken belief that the fighting was as a result of either existing
problems or because of some excuse which the perpetrators of the violence created.
Phillip Cheruiyot, at one time the Provincial Police Officer of the Rift Valley Province
expressed the same sentiments as appear in the following excerpt from the verbatim
report of the proceedings of the Judicial Commission of 13th August, 1998:
"Mr. Gacivih: Now, in the 1992 clashes, who were the raiders?
Mr. Cheruiyot: The raiders were Kalenjin wgirriors.
Mr. Gacivih: When you say warriors, are these people who are ably employed or did you
identify where they were coming from?"
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Mr. Cheruiyot: In 1992; they were from the Dorobo side, from the forest. Mr. Gacivih:
By forest you mean Ndoinet?
Mr. Cheruiyot: Yes, Ndoinet Forest, My Lords.".
When he was asked to compare those and the 1998 clashes, his
response was as follows:
"Mr. Cheruiyot:
Unlike before, when there was information of
recruiting and preparation by the attackers, this time we
did not get anyinformation to that effect. In fact, even the attackers did not wear the
normal warriors clothes. Their clothes were normal, actually, there was nothing about
them to indicate that they were raiders.".
In each of the clash areas we have already discussed, an excuse or excuses were given
for the clashes. It has been a common feature that clashes were preceded by the wounding
or killing of animals, particularly where, in mixed communities, there are no existing
inter-ethnic problems.
In Olenguruone for instance, apart from the death of the mysterious Kiplangat Arap
Kipkilach, we were given the wounding of livestock as one of the causes of the clashes
there, in 1992. In Molo South too a similar story was told.
Gideon Muoki Mutua who was the Provincial Criminal Investigations Officer of the
Rift Valley Province in 1997 and 1998, also told us of an incident in Keringet area where
on the night of 24th August, 1997, nine heads of cattle belonging to some Kalenjin were
maimed, an incident which he said caused tension between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu.
Two Kikuyu and a Kisii were arrested as suspects and charged.
The then Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner, Mohamed Yusuf Haji, organized an
impromptu harambee which raised one hundred and twenty thousand shillings which was
handed over to the complainants as compensation. The compensation diffused the tension
and frustrated what we think were planned clashes. In view of our above analysis, of the
masterminding of the clashes, it could be that the Kikuyu had no hand in the killing and
maiming of the goats and cattle of Lechau Apalungeiya which allegedly started the
clashes in 0l Moran.
In most, if not all the clash torn areas, in the Rift Valley Province, it is clear that the
clashes were preceded either by the presence of strange faces or an incident involving the
maiming, killing or theft of livestock. The incidents clearly seem to have been planned to
create or provide an excuse for the violence which thereafter ensued but which were
clearly intended to achieve a political purpose.
In Ol Moran and Njoro, whoever planned and executed the clashes must have
intended topunish and tame Kihika Kimani and his political supporters who we were told
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exuded confidence and arrogance during the 1997 election campaigns, and to teach them
a lesson so that they would not behave like that again.
The mastermind of the clashes appears to have enjoyed the support of the Provincial
Administration and the Police Force, more particularly the Special Branch Officers
whose role, particularly in the clashes at the Coast Province and Njoro seems to us to be,
at the very least one of connivance and condonation of the same. We have the example of
Omari Raisi, in Mombasa, and Kipkorir Siele, in Nakuru, both officers who appear to
have known all along what was happening and most likely, were party to it but withheld
intelligence information from the other security arms.
We were also told of two Chiefs who were directly involved in the Njoro clashes,
botably, the Chief of Balut, a Kalenjin, and the Chief of Likia, a Kikuyu, both of whom
were later interdicted and charged, but no one was able to tellus the outcome of their
cases. We see no reason why Omari Raisi and David Kipkorir Siele and others, should
not face the same fate.
Tomorrow: Coast Province
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